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CLERK'S INDEX

PAUL WILLIAM VOGEL, P.A.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 1828
SANDPOINT, ID 83864
PHONE (208) 263-6636
FAX (208) 265-6775
ISB NO. 2504

2888 JAN I LI P 3: l I.
ST,A..TE GF IDAHO

COUWT'I OF KOUHDARY

IN THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE FRST JUD
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA
GARDWER, husband and wife,

CASE NO. CV-2006-339
MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT RE:
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

Petitioners,
VS.

BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,

1

Respondent.

STATE OF IDAHO

1
SS.

County of Bonner

1

Paul William Vogel, being duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:

1.

Affiant submits this Memorandun1 and Affidavit Re: Attorney Fees and Costs

pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 and I.A.R. 40@). The attorney fees in this action were charged based on
consideration of the following:

Paul William Vogel, P.A.
Attorney-at-Law
120 East LakcStreel
Suite313
P.O. Box 1828
Snndpoint, ID 83864.0903
Ph: (208) 263-6636
Fnx: (208) 265-6775

A.

The time and labor required.

B.

The novelty and difficultyof the questions of law involved therein.

C.

The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the
experience and ability of Affiant in the particular field of law.
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2.

The prevailing charges for like work.

E.

The fact that the fee was based on Affiant's hourly rate.

F.

The results obtained.

G.

The reasonable cost of coinputer assisted legal research.

At the time these proceedings com~enced,in June, 2006, Affiant charged for his

services the rate of $150.00 per how. This rate increased to $160.00 per hour in January, 2007.
The hourly rate increased to $170.00 per hour in July, 2007. The rate increased to $180.00 per
how commencing in January, 2008.
3.

Petitioners are entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs pursuant to the

Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order Setting Aside Special Use Permit.

4.

To the best of Affiant's knowledge and belief, the items contained below are

correct and the costs are claimed in compliance with the applicable rules set forth below.

5.

DATE

/I

D.

Affiant provided the following legal services:

SERVICE

TIME

HOURLY
RATE

6/12/06

Phone conference with clients; letter to clients

.I0

$lSO.OO

6/26/06

Review letter from clients and Notice; messages for
clients

.10

150.00

7/6/06

Review letter from clients; message for clients; letter
to Topp

.20

150.00

7/6/06

Phone conference with Ada

.10

150.00

7110106

Review letter from clients, code section and ordinance

.10

150.00

711 1/06

Review letter from Topp to Dinning; letter to clients

.I0

150.00

711 1/06

Phone conference with Ada; Tungsten is working
today

.10

150.00

711 1/06

Phone conference with Topp

.10

150.00
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SERVICE

DATE
7/17/06

NOURLY
RATE

TIME

.20
150.00
0

7118/06

Phone conference with Douglas; message for clients

.10

150.00

7/18/06

Phone conference with Pat

.20

150.00

7118/06

Legal research re: Regan v. Kootenai County

'20

150.00

711 9/06

Phone conference with Pat

.10

150.00

7/21/06

Phone conference with Ada

.10

150.00

7/24/06

Travel time to and from Bonners

1.8

75.00

7/24/06

Attendance at Commissioners meeting

1.5

150.00

7/27/06

Phone conference with clients

.10

150.00

.10

150.00

7/27/06

/ Letter to: Rohnvasser
I

713 1/06

1r
Review letter from Rohrwasser; letter to clients

I
I

.10

I

150.00

8/2/06

Phone conference with Pat; letter to Weland

.30

150.00

8/7\06

Travel time to and from Bonners

1.8

75.00

8/7/06

Attendance at Commissioners meeting

1.1

150.00

8/10/06

Phone conference with Ada; phone conference with
Rohrwasser

.20

150.00

8/10/06

/ Letter to Rohrwasser

I

I

1/8/06

/ Phone message for clients; revision of Petition

I

I

I

.20

150.00
150.00

.40

Review Takings Analysis Request; phone conference
with Rohrwasser to request a copy of the Findings;
preparation of rough draft of Petition

9/6/06

.20

I

150.00

9/8/06

Letter to Clerk; to Commissioners

.10

150.00

3/21/06

Review Order Governing Judicial Review; letter to
clients

.10

150.00

9/26/06

Letter to clients; messages for clients
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.I0

150.00

TIME

HOURLY
RATE

Review letter from Ada; phone conference with Pat;

.20

150.00

10/3/06

Preparation of Objection to Record

.80

150.00

10/3/06

Phone conference with Ada

.10

150.00

1014106

Review message from clients and 7-19-06 submission;
message for clients

.I0

150.00

10/4/06

Phone conference with Ada

.20

150.00

1014106

Revision of: Objection; letter to Rohnvasser

.30

150.00

10/23/06

Phone conference with Amy Bistline; with Pat; with
Amy

.10

150.00

10i24i06

Phone conference with Ada re: attorney fees and cost
issues; discuss briefing schedule

.20

150.00

10126106

Review stipulation and letter from BistI~ne;letter to
Bistline; phone conference with Della re: 10-5-06
filing error; phone conference with Michelle re:
Amended Notice; phone conference with Pat

.40

150.00

11/1/06

Conference with clients; preparation of Objection;
letter to Rohrwasser; to Topp; preparation of
stipulation

.40

150.00

11/2/06

Conference with clients; preparation of Supplemental
Objection

.70

150.00

SERVICE

DATE
1013106

11/3/06

0

1 Review pleadings from Bistline; letter to Douglas
I

1113106

1 Phone conference with clients
I
1 Review letter from Ada; letter to Douglas

150.00

.20

I

I
.10

I

150.00

I
.30

150.00

Phone conference with Tammy re: she wants to talk to
John about all this before Jack takes action

.10

150.00

Phone conference with Pat; with Tarnmy at Douglas's
office;
letter
to Bistline
-

.20

150.00

Review stipulation; message for Bistline

.I0

150.00

11/7/06
1117106

I
1117106

11/10/06

//
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TIME

SERVICE

DATE

RATE
11/14/06
11/16/06

1 Review letter from Bistline; letter to Douglas
1 Letter to Clerk to Bistline and Topp

.10

I
10

150.00

.20

150.00

I

Review letter from clients and enclosure; letters to
client; to To= and Bistline; preparation of stipulation

11/27/06

I

150.00

/ / / 11130106 1 Phone message for Hull; phone conference with Ada 1

.30

1

150.00

12/4/06

Conference with clients re: settling the record

.10

150.00

12/5/06

Phone conference with Hull re: record; he has all
objections and will file a notice once record is settled

.I0

150.00

12/8/06

Phone conference with client re: proposed
amendments to Comp Plan and her desire to proceed
without delay

.I0

150.00

12/26/06

Phone conference with Topp; run everything through
Hull

.20

150.00

1/4/07

Phone conference with clients; letter to clients

.10

160.00

1/5/07

Phone conference with clients; letter to Hull

.20

160.00

/ / 1 ll10107 1 Revision of letter to Hull
/ 1 1/22/07 1 Phone conference with Ada

.I0

160.00
I

I

.I0
I

160.00
I

2/12/07

Phone conference with Hull's secretary; review file;
fax letter to Hull

.I0

160.00

2120107

Letter to clients

.10

160.00

Phone conference with clients.

.I0

Phone conference with clients; with Hull; preparation
of stipulation; letter to Hull

.10

/I I

2/21/07

// /

4/10/07

3/1/07

4/13/07

1I Phone conference with clients
Review clients' brief; reparation of attorney fee
section and conclusion

Revision of Memorandum
4/16/07
-

160.00

I

I

I

.10
2.90

I

160.00
160.00
160.00

1
1

SERVICE

DATE

TIME

HOURLY
RATE

4/26/07

Phone conference with Ada; message for Bistline

.10

160.00

5/16/07

Phone conference with clients

.20

160.00

5/17/07

Phone message for Hull; phone conference with Court
Clerk; phone conference with Ada

.20

160.00

5/22/07

Phone conference with Hull; he hopes to have the brief
done this week

.10

160.00

6/4/07
6/25/07

I Review Hull's memorandum; letter to clients
I
1 Phone conference with clients; need an extension
I

6/26/07

Review clients' brief
I

Phone conference with clients

7/9/07
I

.60

I
I

160.00

I
.I0

I

.70
I

I

160.00
160.00

I

160.00

.10

1

7/26/07

Review reply brief; phone conference with Ada;
revision of brief; legal research re: substantial rights;
phone conference with Ada re: Appendix 1 and the
record; only mining portions were included

2.70

170.00

7/30/07

Phone message for Court Clerk; phone conference
with Pat; message for Robnette; for Marshall; review
clients' research on substantial rights; review revised
standing argument

.70

170.00

7130107

8/2/07
8/13/07

1 Phone conference with clients

I

.I0

I

170.00

Phone conference with Pat; clients will not stipulate to
allow intervention

.20

Phone conference with clients re: intervention

.10

170.00

.10

170.00

Review letter from Bistline; letter to Bistline
8/31/07
-

170.00
1

10123107

Phone conference with Judge Michaud and Robinson;
phone conference with Pat

.20

170.00

10/23/07

Legal research re: Fox v. Boundaw Countv

.30

170.00

10/24/07

Phone conference with client

.20

170.00

SERVICE

DATE

TIME

NOUIUY
RATE

10125107

Preparation of Oral Argument

170.00

10125107

Court hearing re: Oral Argument

170.00

10125107

Travel time to and &om Bonners

85.00

10130107

Phone conference with legislative service

10130/07

Review legislative history; letter to clients

1/3/08

Review Memorandum Opi~~ion;
phone conference
with clients

1/7/08

Preparztion of Attorney Fee and Cost Memorandum

TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES

lI

6.

The following costs as a matter of right are submitted pursuant to

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l):

AMOUNT

ITEM
Court filing fee for Petitioil for Judicial Review

7.

$82.00

The following costs are aIIowed pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40(b):

AMOUNT

ITEM
Certified copies of hearing transcripts, July 23,2006 and audio CD of
hearing, certified copies of hearing minutes
Certified copies of hearing transcripts, August 7,2006
Certified copies of record beginning May 30,2006

8.

$128.75
118.50
55.00

Petitioners seek discretionary costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D).
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I

I

/

ITEM
A.

Petitioner's expert witness fees paid to Kristine Uhlman, R.G.

B.

Lexpert Research Services referral fee

C.

Air fare - expert's travel to Idaho to view property

I

AMOUNT
$5,000.00

1

/

TOTAL RE: EXPERT WITNESS
Although this discretionary cost is not a cost as a matter of right under
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(8); and although said cost exceeds $2,000.00, said cost should be
awarded to Petitioners because Petitioners reduced legal fees in this matter by conducting their
own research as set forth in paragraph 9 below. Petitioners are licensed attorneys in the State
of California and devoted approximately 200 hours of time in research and Memorandum
preparation in this case. Petitioners do not seek to recover for their time and the time they
devoted to this matter results in direct savings to Respondent on the basis that, had Petitioners
requested Affiant to do all the legal research, Affiant's attorney fees would be substantially in
excess of those claimed above. Further, it is apparent from the record in this case that
retention of an expert witness by Petitioners was reasonable and necessary under the
circumstances of the case.

9,

Petitioners incurred costs for automated legal research which are recoverable

under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(K). The initial research in this case was conducted by Petitioners.
Affiant reviewed cases located and briefed by Petitioners and, as a result thereof, Affiant did
not incur any direct legal research costs.

I
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Legal research costs are based on Petitioners' utilization of LexisNexis for the time
period June 3, 2006 through December 31, 2007. The total cost for electronic research,
sought to be recovered, is $8,114.00. ' Attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit A
are true and accurate copies of the computer assisted research bills charged by Lexis and paid
by Petitioners.
10.

Summary.
$5,222.00

Attorney fees
Costs as a matter of right

82.00

Costs as a matter of right

302.25

Discretionary costs

6,418.00

Automated legal research costs

8.1 14.00
$20,138.25

TOTAL

This Memorandum and Af'fidavit Re: Attorney Fees and Costs is supplemented
by the Affidavit of Petitioner, Ada Gardiner, dated January 9, 2008, attached hereto as

Exhibit B and incorporated herein.
Dated this 10th day of January, 2008.

1

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th d y of Ja,nuarpi, 2008

11
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that on this 10th day of January, 2008, I delivered a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM AND MFIDAVIT RE: ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
via U.S. fmt class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Boundary County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1148
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805

Phil ~obinson
Bonner County Prosecuting Attome))
P.O. Box 1486
Sandpoint, ID 83864
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!NVOlCE NO.
06063~2737

\ 1HvOlcE DATF
1 30-JUN.06

B I L L I N ~p E R l O O

01-JUN-06

-

30,JUN.OS

US )L-

TAX ID 611671842
CIV(RDIwGO-8TPITIOn
NUMBER lZfl97457RT
r n BRI\I)GTRGT
~
NUMBER BT-767.2611$

L

I3Fm INQUIRIES R W D I H O 1)(16 I M C E
p-6
CALL BL0282-PJWI AND PRESG 3"

CURRENT' PERIOD TOTAL

EXHIBIT A - Page 1

I t i V O I C E NO,

c ~ e xs Ni exis*

0607311(118

-

INYOICE

k-JUL-

B I L L I N G PERIOD

01- JUL-06

-

31-JUL-06

""&

INVGfCE TO:

hmii'V6fEADA GARDINER
EARDINER LAW FIRM
HC tso Bax 226
PORTHILL LO 838539701
UNITED STATES

INVOICE $UMMARY

TOTALADJUS

EXHfBlT A - Page 2

"

,.---,n-

?,-

.;

,-:,-.

"F,

,

li".
. - E..-.

XNVO1 CE No.
0608349809

I IRVUICE

ACCWHT NUMBER

DATE

1 31- AU@-06

B I L L I N G PERIOD

01- AUG-06

12QS9K

-

31-AUG.06

INWlRlB R E M D I N G THIS 1WMlCE
PLEPSE C ~ V L8mm.PS1AND PREIS 3-

'FUR

. ADA QARDlNER

GARDINER LAW FIRM
HC 60 BOX 228
PORTHILL ID 61863-9701
UNITED STATES

EXHIBIT A - Page 3

ACCWNT

NUHBER

!29S9K
B I L L 1 NG PERIOD

01-5EP-06

-

3D-SEP-06

C60SOXDJ

3RTHILL $5 838S-8701
TENTID~JADA CARDINER

LY ACTXVITt
-lAf@E&

CREDITS AH0 TAX

LMISNEXIS ONLINE CHARGES

CONTRACT

CONTR At7
ALL SERYICES

i$336.00
mu.E

USE 8 P R l H T

BRGSS

.

C611TRACT USE
ALL S I R V I C E S

Am!u

USE k P R I N T

SVBTOTAl

$0.00

CAP

AHOLIN'I
ADJOSTNEHT

A!w!I

HET

&Q
.N
!L

$336.00

$336.00

"
'IOTM. L E X I SHEXIS ONLl HE CHARGES

CURREUT PERIOD CHARGES, CREDITS AND TAX TOT&
PAYMENTS'
16 SEP 2006: INVOICE: 0658949809
PAYMENT TOTAL

: 6527

*PAYMENTS I N TRMSIT

RAY NOT BE REFLECTED OH

EXHIBIT A - Page 4
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;$336.00)
MIS STATEMENT

&) u 8 H k a d s

1~~~~~~~

I INVOICE DATE 11
II
I $1-DJY-00
PERIOD 01-061-68 - 31-OCT-06

0810315222

BIIUMG

~,".~~~$E~@8ryfi:j6g74s~~i
LEXISNE~~B

ACCOUNTNWeW
(2868K

CURPER OH6

,WTDUE USO

$SY.W
$ZAEZW

p k y ~ ~ h ~ NET
n ~10 ~
DAY8
6 :mON hE@lPi

PO WX 2511
CAROL STREAM.1L 60132-2314

INVMCE IP;

A n S T I O N : PDA CARDINER
jXRW FIRM
pORTHIU ID 89863-81Q1
UNil'EP STATES

;%tgg

EXHIBIT A - Page 5

-.p-y

LexisNexis5

I N V O I C E RO.

INVOlCE D A E

6611316854

30-HOY-06

BILLEUC PERIOD

01-NOY-06

ACCOUNT NUMBER
129S9K

-

30-NOV-06

"..FOR IHW~RIES
REGARDING TdIS I W C 6
PLEPSE CALL Bmm.mP1 AND PRESS 1-

!NVOlCE 10:

ADA GARDINER

GARDINER LAW FIRM

ilc M) BSX 228

?OKWILL ID 838558701
UNITED STATE6

INVOICE SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION
$2,402.00

ACCOUNT BAhANCE 31QCT-

CURRENT CHA'ES
AND CREDITS
CURRENT TAX
TOTAL PAYMENTS RECEIVED
PRIOR PERIOD CREDITS
PRIOR PERIOD CREDIT TAX
TOTAL ADJUSTMENT8 APPLIED

93

'$8: OD
!8:00!

00
t

3@: ;o",
iX: 800

ACCOUNT BALANCE 30-NOV.08

I sqg

EXHIBIT A - Page 6

r 536 -t- 189

INVOICE RO,

LexisNexis5
OlCE T

.

! $e4k mBOXi L228w

061232D607

1 rnvor

CE

ACCOUNT HUWER

DATE

1 31.DEC.06

B ~ L L ~ N PERIoV
G

O1.OEC-06

129S9K

-

31,DEC-C6

FIRM

;G

'ORTHILL ID 83553-9701
ITIENTION: ADA GARDIHER

CURRENT PERIOD C W G E S . CREDITS AND TAX
LEXISSXIS ONLINE dl. RELATED CHARGES
ALL SERVLCES

-

CONTRACT USE
ALL SERVICES

CONTRACT

cD)ITRAC.CT

USE 8 PRINT

USE 4 P R I N T

9UBTQTAL

TOTAL L E X l S H E X l S O H L I N E 6

RELATED

CAP

Akm!X

BClnUlCZ

@ROSS

ADJUtiTNEHT

3335.00

AMQm
!.
$617.01)

AM!u.L

g;:;%f

NET

AM!.w

$336.00

CHARGES

CURREKT PERIW CHAUGES. CREDITS AND TAX TOTAL
PAYHEUrS*
19 CEC 2006: LNVOICE: 0511316854

!5336.00)
: 4558
~ A Y H E N Tr o w
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Sub]:

3at91:
From:
TO:

L8xisNexis &aptamber 2007 invoice Notllloatlon
10/6/2007 10:30:46 P.M.Pacific Standard Time
dnvol~c.notifi~alion
@.l,~xisqe$s.cQm
adagardlner@aol.com

To view your INVOICE for thls month's billing, or for any Online!
Acmunt Management optlone, cllck on thrp foilowlng llnk to take you
Into PowerInvoice'":

Current accaunt information as of October 6, 2007 for
GARQINER LAW FIRM.
l2WSK

Account Number
Involcs Nurnber
Invoice Date
Invoice Amount
Account Bi+lance

0709296271
September 30, ZOO7
$SSS.OQ
$JJ6.00

you can BAY YOUR BALANCE ONLPAIE through the Powerlnvoice
link abave, if you would like to send your payment through the mall,
please prlnt your lnvolce ham Powerlnvoice and mall to the address
indicated on the lnvoice statement. The Invoice statements are
downloadable as a printable Image flle supported and viewable using
Adobe Acrobat@. If you do not hove Adobe Acrobat@, please find a
link to a fme downloadable flle at the end of thls e-mall.
I f you have quctstipns alwui your Invalce, please COntaCt
LexisNexls at 1-800-262-2391, option 3,

rf you wourd iike to contact your Account Managar, please contact
LexisNexis at 1-800-262-2391, option 2.
Please add this domain @ernali.lexlsnexlsmaIIIcom to your Safe
senders list.
Adobe Acrobat@ free downloadable file avallabla at :
http://www.adobe,com/pr~duc~atrobar/retrnl
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Monday, October IS, 2007 America Online: Adagardiner
:

,

r.ir;i

i

:.mi ! T T~!<.(C,

:rp,?!.%?qqr

i t =

:qi

f i f i n x t n '73

Page 1 of 2

-

lnvoioa Notiticalion for Novembsr 2001 LexisNexis
12110/200710:4234 P.M Pacif~cStandard Time

Cubj:
Cwte.

To vlew your xNvQXCE for this month's blillng, or for any Online
Account Management. options, click on the Following llnk to take you
Into PowerInvolceTn:

Current account information as of Deeember 11, 2007 far

OWRDIHER Lnw PIRM.

1295SK

Account Number
Invoice Number
Invoice Date
Invoice Amount
Account Balance

0712357569
Movernkr 30, 2007

$?B@.QQ~
f336.00
-.
...
*.~

You can PAY YOUR BALANCE ONLPNIG through the PowerInvolce
link above. If you would llke to send your payment through the mall,
please print your Invoice from PowerInvolce and mail to the address
lndtcated on the invoice statement, The invoice statements are
downloadable as a printable image flle supported and viewable using
Adobe Acrobat@. I f you do not h a w Adobe Acrobat@, please find a
link to a free downloadable File at the end of this e-mall,

You can also prlnr this e-mail and send your payment Lo:
LexieNaxis

PO Bax 7247-7090
Philsdelphla, PA 191150-9898
I f you have questlous a b u t your invoice, please contact
LexlsNexls a t 1-800-262-2391, option 3,

would llke Lo contact your Account Managlar, pleem contact
LexisNexis a t 1-800-262-2391,
optlon 2 ,

Ifyou

Please add thls domain @emali.lexlsnexlsm~lI~Com
to Your safe'
senders list.
Adobe Acrobat@ free downloadable file available at :
httr,://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep;Z.html
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GARDINER LAW OFFICE
APAOARDINER

G4RDINER LAW OFRCE
ADA QARDINER
WRMtBOX22810WNST
P a R M l U ID 63863

HCR 60 SOX 228 10 W I N ST
PORTHILL ID 83855

Thank you fot YOUS o r d e ~ ,we're oonfident you w i l l find this t o be a valuable
addition t o your library. Please refex a l l inqtiiries t o our Customex ServiCaS
Depazlnent. Our sesvicea aze avgilpbln Monday-Friday EAM-8PM EST.
Phone (8003 833-3544, Fax [518]487-3584,

Authorized By:ADA

.-

.---0820513032

rJlRDINER

2666.00
286.402577.60
Servzce P s r i o d : 01-06 06-07 ADRTCULTUSAL LAW FULL SET W/BVC
1

133 .00

Payment
C P l L YOUR ACCT MGR,
I

"

.------

JERXY COHEN.
r--r

a'$

01

128.88

mount Dua

FOR INI"O,ABOOTOtlR PUBLYCATIONS

---------"

cr=-",J" .z,7.sr.PPPPP.PPP.P---'-
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PAUL WILLIAM VOGEL, P.A.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 1828
SANDPOINT, ID 83864
PHONE (208) 263-6636
FAX (208) 265-6775
ISB NO. 2504
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA
GARDINER, husband and wife,

CASE NO. CV-2006-339
AFFIDAVIT OF ADA GARDWR

Petitioners,

BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,

//

i

Respondent.

I

STATE OF WAHO
SS.
County of Boundary

I

I
/I

Ada Gardiner, being duly swom on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

Affiant submits this AfEdavit pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54

2.

Petitioner seeks recovery for the reasonable cost of automated legal research in

the mount of $8,11400
3.

Paul William Vogel, P.A.
Attorney-at-Law
120 East Lake Street
Suite 313
P.O.Box 1828
Sandpoint. ID 838660903
Ph: (208) 263-6636
Fax: (208) 265-1775

My husband, Pat Gardiner, and I subscribed to LexisNexis electronic research

to assist us in researching the legal issues involved in this case. Our contract was for $336.00
per month so long as we did not exceed our parameters of Idaho and federal Ninth Circuit

AFFIDAVIT OF ADA GARDWER - I

aN
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11

parameters. However, the research was for this case as follows:

/I
1
!/

1( 1

4.

A.

Restatement of property ($384.00);

B.

Business and corporation information ($175.00);

C.

Combined federal and state cases ($1,035.00);

D.

State court cases ($284.00);

E.

C.F.R. regulations (OSHA) ($53.00);

F.

Ninth Circuit federal and state cases ($135.00).

We conducted legal research over a period of 18 months at a cost of $336.00

per month, for $6,048.00. The additional casts total $2,066.00, for a total of $8,114.00
Dated this

,?& day of January, 2008.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

95

day of January, 2008.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at $8 u-ddeb, Z d i+ h a
My Commission Expires: ,9-/8-//
w
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FAX No.

BOUNDARY COUNTY C M L ATTORNEY
,
Philip W.Robinson (ISBN 1323)
Po ]BOX 1405
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6714
(208)263-6726 (Fax)

10833 JhN 2h p

1: 59

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICLPJI DISTRICT OF THJ3
STATE OF IDAHO, II\T AND FOR THE COUNTY O F BOUNDARX

PATRXCIC GARDINER and ADA

/

Case No.: CV 2006-339

GAW)WER, husband &d wife,

OBJECTXON TO A T T O W Y FEES
AND COSTS

Petitioners,
vs.

B O r n A R Y COUNTY BOARD OF

1

Respondent.

~ Y BOARD OF COMNLISSIO~RS,
the
COMES NOW, 1 3 0 ~ COUNTY
Respondent, by and through its attorney, Phil Robinson, and hereby objects to
attorney fees and costs,submitted to the Court, pursuant t o IRCP 54 and moves this
Coat. ta disallow part or all attorney fees and costs stated in the Respondent's
Memorandum and MEdavit Re: Attorney Fees and Costs. Petitioner objects to the
amount of fees and costs as foIIows.

SpecificalIy,'Petitionerobjeck to the time axpended.byRespondents'
attorney, Mr. Vogel. Petitioner does not doubt Mr. VogeI's time keeping only that
the efforts put forth by Mr. Vogel were necessary., As stated in the Court's

OBJECTTOLJ TO FEES- 1

JAN-24-2008-TBU 01 : 39 PM BONWR CO.PROSECUTOR

FAX No,

Memorandum and Opinion, the boundary county subdivision ordinance 99-06,
chapter 7, pertaining to special use permits is void. Therefore, Respondents or Nr.
Vogel could have simply fled a Petition for Declaratory Judgment. Ifthat avenue
had been taken by the Respondents the attorney's fees would have been
considerably less.
The total expert fees should not be allowed. They are far above the allowed
amount of Two Thousand Dollars ($2000.00) Furthermore, these fees are
unreasonably and extremely high for the services needed and even the services
performed by Ms. Uhlman. MB. Uhlmao was never even required t o testify before
the B o d of Commissioners. She simply submitted a short report, Petitioner
objects Lo the Lexpert Research services referral fee of One Thousand TWOHundred

P i Dollars ($1250.00). The Petitioners, well educated attorneys, should have
been able to k d an expert through other less expensive means or for a lesser fee.
Petitioners argue that they should be given a greater allowance for
discretionaqy fees since as licensed attorneys they did not biU for their some Two
Hundred (200) hours of work on their own case. As they are not licensed in the
state, have not filed forpro h c vice status, and have not entered a notice of
appearance in this Court, they are not entitled to attorneys fees. They are not
entitled to attorneys fees, whether disguised as discretionary costs or not.
The Petitioner also objects to the research fees of Eight Thousand One
Huadred Fourteen Dollars ($8,114). According to IRCP 54(e)(3)(K),research fees

are classified as part of attorney fees m d as petitioners are not licensed attorneys
in the state of Idaho they are not entitled to the recover legal research fees. Even if

the Court finds that they are entitled to some research fees, these fees are excessive,
unreasonable and unnecessary. The tax payers of Boundary County should not be
required to fund the legal research of the petitioners on their own case. While eight
thousand dollars may be reasonable in California for legal research, it is not in
Boundary County, Idaho. Furthermore, with the internet available, most case law

OBYECTXON TO FEES- 2

JAN-24-2008-THU 01 : 39 PM BONWER CO.PROSECUTOR

FAX No.

is a d l a b l e for free on each stake's web site. The relevant cases cited by the Court
were almost solely from the Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
Responaent respectifidly requests argument on these issues.

Attorney for Respondent

C E R r n C A r n OF DELIVERY
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e 2qth day of January, 2005, I caused t o be
served a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e foregoing document as addressed t o t h e
following:

OBJECTION TO FEES- 3

PAUL WILLJAM VOGEL, P.A.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 1828
SANDPOINT, ID 83864
PHONE (208) 263-6636
FAX (208) 265-6775
ISB NO. 2504
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THFi FRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA
GARDINER, husband and wife,

CASE NO. CV-2006-339

Petitioners,

MEMORANDUM AND ARGUMENT IN
SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS' FEE AND
COST MEMORANDUM

VS.
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,
Respondent.

I

Patrick Cardiner and Ada Gardiner, husband and wife, through their attorney, Paul
William Vogel, hereby submit this Memorandum and Argument in Support of Petitioners' Fee
and Cost Memorandum. This Argument is based on the files and pleadings herein, together with
the Declaration of Ada Gardiner dated January 23, 2008, attached hereto and incorporated
herein.
Paul William Vogel, P.A.
Attorney-at-Law
120 East Lake Stren

Suite 313
P.O. Box 1828
Sandpoint. ID 838640903
Ph: (208) 263-6636

The sole purpose of petitioners' contract with Lexis was to prepare for this case. They
had no contract with Lexis or any other automated legal research service prior to these
proceedings. They are retired from their California law practice, do not practice law in Idaho,

Fax: (208) 265-6775

MEMORANDUM AND ARGUMENT IN SUPPORTOF PETITIONERS' FEE AND COST MEMORANDUM - I

and had no need for this service except to prepare for this case. The Gardiiers contracted for the
most minimal cost service that would be adequate to prepare for this case, which service was
limited to Idaho law and Federal Ninth Circuit cases.
The Gardiners are attorneys in good standing, members of the California State Bar, and
admitted to practice in the federal courts and courts of appeal, and in the United States Supreme
Court. They are trained and experienced in automated legal research. They used the research
service to efficiently assist my office in the preparation of their case. They have not charged
anything for their time spent on research.
Automated legal research was necessary, given that the respondent is a government
agency with its own legal staff with virtually udimited resources for litigation and research,
especially considering the fact that the County does not have to pay an hourly rate for legal
services.
Given the number of hearings that were involved, the documentary evidence, the large
admiistrative record, and the breadth of public issues in this case, legal research was necessary.
Although it was necessary to exceed the basic, monthly p m e t e r s to research certain
issues, the agency's actions involved all of the issues researched outside of the basic service
provided. For example, the basic service did not include federal statutes such as OSHA, federal
mining, clean air and environmental laws or Supreme Court decisions on the subject of equal
protection, condemnation and government takings of property. Particularly, since Idaho law
provides for requests for takings analysis as a relatively new administrative remedy to claims
involving the effect of government actions on private property, it was necessary to research these
areas.

MEMORANDUM AND ARGUMENT W SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS' FEE AND COST MEMORANDUM - 2

as0

The only reason OSHA became an issue was because the Commissioners put it in issue.
They relied on 29 C.F.R., subpart U, as a condition of mitigation in its decision granting the
special use permit. The County did not provide a copy of the regulations to anyone or explain
how those regulations assisted adjacent property owners. In fact, the regulation did not relate to
adjacent owners and, without the legal research, my clients would have simply had to accept the
erroneous statements of the Zoning Administrator.
It was only through a review of OSHA regulations that my clients were able to determine
that there was no evidence supporting the County's proposition that OSHA protected adjacent
property owners' property underground water from blasting in Tungsten's gravel pit. The
research revealed that: the regulations were not cited correctly, and that there is no 29 C.F.R.
subpart U. The proper citation is 29 C.F.R. (labor, ch. XVII (OSHA), part 1926.900 (safety and
health regulations for construction), subpart U (blasting and the use of explosives). The
@roper

cite required extra time to locate and there are no OSHA provisions concerning

precautions for safety to adjacent properties or water resources.
OSHA, a workplace safety statute, has nothing to do with adjacent property rights or
property owners, or safe blasting practices. Furthermore, OSHA does not require blasters to be
qualified.
This research was important because it clearly demonstrated that the Commissioners did
not know or understand OSHA regulations, had no knowledge whether or not they applied to the
Gardiners' property concerns, and were not concerned about their lack of such knowledge.
Accordingly, this research supported Petitioners' contention that the decision was arbitrary and
capricious.

-
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Sound and thorough legal research was critical because this case concerned government
action and the abuse of government power over individuals subject to the government's
jurisdiction.

Individuals would be deterred from pursuing meritorious claims against

government agencies if they are prevented from access to the same automated legal research that
attorneys for government agencies routinely access. If governments are allowed to escape the
costs of automated legal research of successful challenges to their decisions, this would have the
undesirable effect of encouraging government abuse.
The Gardiners shodd also be able to recover their expert witness fees. If the County had
properly applied the burden of persuasion to the applicant, the Commissioners could and should
have required Tungsten to present expert evidence that the blasting, crushing, and trucking
activities associated with this gravel pit would not injure adjacent properties or adversely impact
current uses of surrounding properties.
By tuming the burden of persuasion around and placing it on appellants, the
Commissioners forced appellants to obtain an expert witness in an effort to, essentially, do the
job that was required of Tungsten. In fact, Chairman Smith challenged the Gardiners by stating:
Is there anythmg, do you have anything that says blasting can
cause water to quit running, or is that just a fear that you have . . .
because we have a comment here (from Rick Dinning, a nonexpert) that said there was no affect . . . a11 I'm interested in is the
fact. If there is some fact out there, or there is some
documentation that says dynamiting can have an affect on
somebody's water, then I'd like to hear it . . . the only thing I am
hearing that we've had dynamiting . . . and there was no effects.
So I have it one way, but I don't have it the other way. C.T.
7/26/05 15:22-25 - 16:l-12.

MEMORANDUM AND ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS' FEE AND COST MEMORANDUM - 4
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Based upon this comment, appellants obtained the services of a registered hydrologist
who visited the site, studied the facts, and prepared a report that appellants submitted for the
record in the July 26,2006 hearing.
Since the Commissioners caused appellants to incur this expense, they should reimburse
appellants in full. The expert's fees are reasonable for the time spent in physical inspection of
the propelty, the study of the facts and preparation of a written opinion. It was contrary to the
applicable burden of proof for Commissioners to require adjacent property owners, not the
applicant development corporation, to incur the cost of an expert as a result of the corporation's
application. Ordering payrslent of these costs would deter such misconduct in the future.
Finally, it needs to be kept in mind that the purpose of 1.C. 12-117 is two-fold: to serve
as a deterrent to groundless and illegal agency action; and to provide a remedy for persons who
have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or
attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never have made. Reardon v. City of Burley, 140
Idaho 115 (2004). Both ofthese reasons apply in the instant case.
At all stages of the proceedings, the County maintained that appellants' case was
frivolous and without merit and refused to give appellants' arguments and evidence due
consideration. This compelled appellants to research a wide variety of issues to prepare for the
record and judicial review, including due process, procedural and substantive issues involving
the Local Land Use Planning Act, spot zoning, takings analysis and issues, state water rights,
state zoning and variance laws, state agency rules and regulations, state open meeting and
competitive bidding laws, state and federal mining, environmental, safety and emissions
standards and regulations and state and federal constitutional issues.

MEMORANDUM AND ARGUMENT LN
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The Idaho Legislature, by enacting the LLUPA, placed a duty of reasoned decisionmaking in zoning cases on local and planning zoning cornmissions and, ultimately, the County
Commissioners. Accordingly, the Legislature adopted a local administrative process that would
quickly settle local land use disputes, de-clog the court system of such cases and minimize
litigation costs overall. These purposes are thwarted when, as in the instant case, the County
abandons its duty, fails to follow its ordinances and basically challenges the objectors to take it
to court. Full costs and fees must be awarded to deter such arbitrary agency action and to
provide a remedy to appellants who bore these costs to correct actions and mistakes the County
never should have made.
Dated this

F
'

day of January, 2008.

I

I

/
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PAUL WILI~AMVOGEL
Attorney for Petitioners
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

this

ihereby certify that on
day of January, 2008, 1 delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM AND ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONERS' FEE AND COST MEMORANDUM as follows:

VIA HAM) DELIVERY

VIA FACSXMLLE DELIVERY

Phil Robinson
Bonner County Prosecuting Attorney
Courthouse Mail

Louis Marshall
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Fax: 263-6726

VIA U.S. MAIL
Boundary County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1148
Bonners Feny, ID 83805
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DECLARATION OF ADA GARDINER

I, Ada Gardiner, declare as follows:
1.

I am one of the appellants in this action. My husband, Patrick J. Gardiner, is the

other appellant.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, and if called as a witness

could and would competently testify to these facts.

3.

I make this declaration in suppoit of appellants' affidavit re: attorney fees and

costs.

4.

On July 5,2006, Patrick and I contracted with LexisNexis for automated legal

research services at the cost of $336 per month. The sole purpose of this contract was to
prepare for this case.
5.

Neither Patrick or I had any contract with LexisNexis or any other automated

legal research service prior to these proceedings.
6.

Patrick and I are attorneys in good standing and members of the California State

Bar. We are also admitted to practice in the federal courts and courts of appeal and in the
United States Supreme Court. We are trained and experienced in automated legal
research.
7.

Patrick and I reside in the State of Idaho. We retired fiom our California law

practice, do not practice law in Idaho and have no current need for an automated legal
research service except to prepare for this case. The monthly rate we received from Lexis
was its small firm rate for research in one state (Idaho) and federal 9thcircuit cases. This
was the lowest cost service we could get that would be adequate to prepare for this case.

8.

Patrick and I used this research service exclusively to assist our attorney, Paul W.

Vogel, in his preparation of our case. Neither Patrick nor I claiin any attorney fees for
our time spent in such research.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 23'" day of January, 2008, at Porthill, Idaho.

Ada Gardiner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
COURT MINUTES
JAMES R MICHAUD
ANNE MACMANUS
LINDA OPPELT
DISTRICT

JUDGE:
REPORTER:
CLERK:
DIVISION:

PATRICK GARDINER, ETAL

CASE NO.
CV-06-339 (BOUNDARY COUNTY CASE)
TIME:
03:30
PM
DATE:
01-31-08
08-16
CD:

vs

BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS

Plaintiff IPetitioner

Defendant IRespondent

Atty:

Atty:

PAUL VOGEL
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PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT RE: ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS AND RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION

PHASE OF CASE
Calls Case
1 PAULVOGEL, PHILIP ROBINSON, LOUIS MARSHALL
Present:
I DON'T HAVE COMPLETE FILE. CITES WHAT DOES HAVE. THAT IS ALL THE
DOCUMENTS THAT PERTAIN TO THIS ISSUE?
YES
HOW TO PROCEED? ANY PROBLEM ABOUT HIM GOING FIRST?
NO
MR. ROBINSON SUGGESTS IF MY EFFORTS WERE NECESSARY. I HAD TO
WORK WlTH VARIOUS PEOPLE (CITES). MULTIPLE PHONE CALLS AND
LETTERS.
TOOK 3.3 HOURS TO WRITE THE BRIEF. I SERVED IN A CONSULTING
POSITION.
SOME COSTS ARE DISCRETIONARY. 8 ISSUES WERE TO BE DECIDED BY
THE COURT AND 6 WERE IN FAVOR OF MY CLIENTS. THE $2000.00 CAP WAS
EXCEEDED.
LEGAL RESEARCH IS UNDER THE ATTORNEY SECTIOFJ. WE RESEARCHED
THE ISSUES OF THE CASE. MONTHLY FEE IS .A. GI'JEN THAT SHOCLD BE
RECOVERED.
I IN CONCLUSION. WE GAVE BOUNDARY COUNTY A BREAK.
1 I BEGAN CHARGING THE GARDINERS A LOWER FEE BECAUSE THEY DID
MOST THE WORK THEMSELVES.
HAVE A ADDITIONAL CASE NALOR V. LATAH COUNTY.
THIS IS TRYING TO ARGUE THE DECISION. NOT APPROPRIATE TO ARGUE
THIS.
MS. OLMAN IS NOT A LICENSE GEOLOGIST IN IDAHO BUT IN ARIZONA. SHE
DID NOT TESTIFY ONLY FILED BRIEFS.
CAP IS $2000.00. 1 DON'T SEE THAT.
LEGAL RESEARCH $8114.00 IS TOO MUCH FOR RETIRED ATTORNEYS IN
CALIFORNIA. EXPLAINS.
SHOULD LOOK AT THE PREVIOUS 2 CASES. TALKS ABOUT CASES.
MOST PEOPLE THINK THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN A GRAVEL PIT BY
PORTHILL. ADJUST THE AMOUNT OF FEES AND COSTS.
WITH REGARD TO THE NAYLOR. THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED ATTORNEY
FEES. NAYLOR WAS A STATE STATUTE NOT A COUNTY ORDINANCE LIKE
Page 1 of 2
DATE: 01-31-06
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Petitioners,
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VS.

330-ARY
COUNTY,a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, acking
through the County B o d of
Co~ioners

Case No. eV-2006-0339
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The above-named Petitioners Ada! and Patrick Gariliner.mdtheir attorney,
Paul VogeI PO BOX1828,Sandpoht, ID 83864the Honorable Jam& Michaud, District
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D
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The above-named Appellant, Bomdary County (hereinafter "Cou11ty"), through

~.~~~-~.,@.~&~~~&.of.Q-~.~~~~~~~,-app&sfrom.a-decisionmade.bp...... ..
the Honorable James Michaud, District Judge for the F h t Judicial Distrid of .the

State of lckho, b and forthe County of BOW*,
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Appeal on the 3d day of ~anuary,2008, improperly ovending a land-use
decision of the Board of edunty Commissionem concerning the approval of a
special use permit for a gravel pit,
This appeal is taken from the ~ i s t c i d
Court of the First Jvdicial District of the

a.

State of Idaho, in aod for the County of Boundary.

Tbis appeal is taken.tothe Supreme Court of the Staee of Idaho ftom the

3.

Honorable James Michaud's Decision on Appeal WIG& determined that the
County improperly granted a speciduse permit f-.or a gravel pit. Tbe COW'S

Memorandum Opinion and Order SettlogAside Specisll Use Permit was entemd

on the 3rd day of January, 2008 at the Boundary County muah-,

B o u n ~

Comty, Idaho, by the fionorabfe Jmes MiChaud, District Judge presiding.

The Couniyh the right to appeal to the Xdaho Supreme Court and thejudgment

4.

or order described in p-aph

1 is an appealable older under and p~~~

to

Rule 11(a)(2) I.&& in that the order referenced inparagraph I. is a hal order of

&e District Court on judicial review reversing the decision of the Counw.
5.

A preliminary statement of the issues mi appeal are:

id the district court err in holding that, BarmaaPy County's

A.
. .

.

.

. . . .

..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

%h&+isi& ~rdinanck99-06,Chapter 7, pertaining to special use parnits is

wid?
Did the district wurt err, hiits determination that the County

B.

iinproperly shifted the burden of persuasion to &e Petitionem?
... - ..............
- - ..............
... __ .....
........... _ .... ....
.........
C.
Did the district court err ind e ~ ~thencounty'
g s decision was
,

arbitrary anrl capriudus because it M e d t o comply wit$ I.C. 67-6535?
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1s Boundary County O r h w Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance

D.

in o o f l c t with Idaho Code 67-6512 and void on j;Es face?; and

99-06

Didthe D i d Court err in awarding attorneys fees and costs to

E.

the Petitioners?
6.

A reporter's trmcript of all orid arguments of the D i e t Court is requested.

7.

Appellant Boundary County requests tbt the following donunents be included in
the Court's record in addition to those automatidy iucluded under Rule 28,
1.A-R,: the parties' mcrtiom, briefs and memorandum below with any briefs,
memoranda and affidavits concankg all issues appealed &om herein should be
included and dowed into the clerk's record.

8.

Icertiijr:
That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the

k
Reporter.

That the Appellant is exempt from paykgthe eslimated transcript

B.

fee because the Appellant is a g w m e n t d entity, that being Boundary Cozuzty,
Idaho.
C.

That the Appellant is exempt ftom paying the esiimated fee for the
......
. . . .- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
pkipiiation ofthe feGrd b&%e the appellant js a governmental entity, that
being Boundary County, Idaho.
That the A p p e h t is exempt from paying the AppeUant filing fee

D.

because the aoppeuant is a governmental entity, that being Bomdary County,
.................

Idaho.

..........................

-
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Pad Vogel
Attorney at Law
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D a d Judge
Courthouse Mdbox

Glenda Poston, County Clerk
Bomdary County
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PAUL WILLIAM VOGEL, P.A
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 1828
' SANDPOINT, ID 83864
PHONE (208) 263-6636
FAX (208) 265-6775
ISB NO. 2504

1

IN T%
I
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA
GARDINER, husband and wife,

CASE NO. CV-2006-339
ATTORNEY FEE MEMORANDUM

Petitioners,

BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,
Respondent.

Court May Order Payment of Expert Witness Costs
Incurred in Administrative Proceedings
Courts may award expert witness fees in administrative proceedings pursuant to
I.C. 12-117(1). This provision states that unless otlierwise provided by statute, the court

"shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees, witness fees and reasonable
expenses" in "any administrative proceeding or civil judicial proceeding involving as
adverse parties. . . a county. . . and a person," if the courts finds that the party against
whom the judgment was rendered "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." This
Paul William Vogel, PA.
Attorney-at-Law
120 East Lake Street
Sutte 313
P.O. Box 1828
Sandpoint, ID 83864-0903
Ph: (208) 263-6636
Fax: (208) 265-6175

statute which is specific to county administrative proceedings makes such awards
ma~ldatory.
Additionally, appellants may be awarded expert witness costs under I.R.C.P.
54(d)(l). See World Cup Ski Shop,Inc. v. Citv of Ketchm, 1IS Idaho 294 (1990). In
ATTORNEY FEE MEMORANDUM - 1
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World Cup, the District Court awarded the full amount of expert witness costs that were
incurred in a conditional use permit proceeding before a City Planning and Zoning
Conunission. The full, requested amount of $1,500.00 was $1,000.00 in excess of the then
$500 maximum expert witness cost authorized by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(8).
The District Court had awarded the excess $1,000.00 portion under Rule
54(d)(l)(D) providing that "additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in
excess of [costs allowed as a matter of right] listed in subparagraph (C) may be allowed

upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred,
and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." (Italics added.)
Under this language, even if expert witness costs were not otherwise authorized under Rule
54(d)(l)(C), such award is still proper as an "additional item of cost" under Rule
54(d)(l)(D) according to the criteria in that provision. Conversely, even if expert witness
costs are authorized by Rule 54(d)(l )(C), the court has discretion to award fees in excess of
the maximum amount as "necessary and exceptional costs" under Rule 54(d)(l)(D).
In World Cup, supra, the District Court had failed to make the findings in Rule
54(d)(l)(D) supporting the $1,000.00 award.

Because the record failed to provide

adequate findings to explain the award, the Supreme Court could not discern whether the
District Court abused its discretion in making the award. On this basis, the Supreme Court
vacated the discretionary costs award and remanded it for reconsideration under Rule
54(d)(l )(D) guidelines. World Cun supra, 118 Idaho at p. 296. Accordingly, the District
Court may exercise its discretion to award expert witness costs in administrative
proceedings under Rule 54(d)(l)(D), and the standard of review of such order and
judgment is abuse of discretion.

/I
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The procedures followed in World CUPaxe similar to the instant matter. The action
commenced with an application to a City Planning and Zoning Commission for a
conditional use permit, in that case for the purpose of expanding a bar near the Sun Valley
Ski Resorl in Ketchum, Idaho. The Zoning Commission granted the permit over the

objections of adjacent business owners. The business owners appealed to the City Council
which affirmed the Zoning Commission's decision. The business owners then filed a
petition for judicial review in District Court, and also sought a preliminary injunction
agai~tstthe proposed expansion. The District Court denied the petition and injunction, and
awarded the bar owner the full amount of his expert witness fees under Rule 54(d)(1).'

In Wo'orld Cup, the expert witness was an appraiser who had "offered testimony"
about the effects of expanding the prevailing party's building. (World Cup, supra, 118
Idaho, at 296.) The decision does not specify whether the appraiser actually testified, or
whether the appraiser's offer of testimony was written or oral. It appears from this case
and the public utility cases that written testimony is proper and typical in administrative
proceedings and that awards for such costs do not depend on the form of testimony.
with the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Idaho Code
This is co~~sistent
67-525 l(2) which states that "[alny part of the evidence may be received in written form if
doing so will expedite the hearing without substantially prejudicing the interests of any
party." Clearly, if expert witness fees could only be ordered as costs for experts who
testify orally in the proceeding, the costs for expert witnesses would be substantially
increased, and valuable agency, court time and public resources would be wasted.

I

The District Court also awarded attorney fees to the city and adjacent owners under I.C. 12-121.
This award was vacated because attorney fees could not be awarded under that statute for cases initiated
before an administrative agency.

ATTORNEY FEE MEMORANDUM - 3
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Further, in R.T. Nahas Co. v. FIulet, 106 Idaho 37 (1984), the District Courl
awarded costs to the prevailing party in a water rights case, including expert witness fees
for a hydrologist/geologist as an extraordinary cost under LR.C.P 54(d)(i)(D). The District
Court denied the non-prevailing party's motion to disallow costs, and made the required
findings that the expert costs were: (1) actually incurred and paid; (2) clearly necessary
and reasonably incurred, in that the expert's testimony was not only critical but of
preemptive importance and value to the court in tlie determination of the matter; and (3)
that justice demanded these exceptional costs should be assessed against the non-prevailing
party.

Id,106 Idaho at p. 43.
On appeal, the non-prevailing party argued that it was unfair to allow recovery of

extraordinary costs in actions to adjudicate water rights. The Supreme Court found "no
merit" in this argument because "[rlule 54(d)(l) does not indicate any limitations, as to the

t,ype ofactions or costs, in its application. We are unpersuaded that the trial court abused
its discretion in allowing recovery of the expert witness fee as a cost." R.T. Nahas Co.,
supra, 106 Idaho at p. 43 (italics added). While this case does not appear to involve an
administrative proceeding, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Rule
54(d)(l) is limited to a specific type of action, and determined that it is not. It follows that
administrative proceedings are not excluded from this statute.
Of note, Idaho Appellate Rule 28(b) stales: "The clerk's or agency's record shall

also include all additional documents requested by any party in the notice of appeal . . .
including, but not limited to. . . statements or affidavits considered by the court or

adnzinistrative agency in the trial ofthe action or proceeding. . . ." (Italics added.) Thus,
no distinction is made in the Idaho Appellate Rules between a "trial" in a civil court or

ATTORNEY FEE MEMORANDUM - 4

before an administrative agency with respect to preparation of the record of the proceeding
on appeal. Clearly, an administrative proceeding with the right of judicial review: as the
instant matter, constitutes a "trial" within the meaning of Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(8). Regardless,
"additional items of cost not enumerated" in subparagraph C may be allowed under Rule
54(d)(l)(D).
It is fundamental that local government agencies sit in a quasi-judicial capacity
when applying general rules or policies to specific individuals, and that such individuals
are entitled to due process, including judicial review of the agency's decision. Turner v.
Citv of Twin Falls, 159 P.3d 840 (2007), quoting Cooper v. Board of Countv Comm'rs,
101 Idaho 407, 410 (1980). See also Comer v. County of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433
(1997) (due process requirements apply to proceedings of local land use boards, including
decisions on applications for conditional land use permits). The statutory scheme for fees
and costs in civil and administrative proceedings involving counties clearly indicates that
the court's discretion under the court's general jurisdiction applies.

An award of the entire amount of expert witness fees incurred by appellants here is
clearly warranted under Idaho Code 12-117 and 1.R.C.P Rule 54(d)(l)(D). The costs were
actually incurred and paid. They were necessary and reasonably incurred because of the
County Board's position that appellants bore the burden of "documenting" harm from
blasting and intensive mining operations, rather than requiring Tungsten to "document"
that no h m would result. The Board's position co~npelledappellants to bear the costs for
such expert testimony. This Court made the finding that the Board acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.

1
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The costs are clearly reasonable for the expert's time in traveling to and visiting the
location, researching and studying the issues, and writing a seven page opinion assessing
the potential for water loss to appellants' property fiom the proposed rock quarry (R.O.A.
79-84). This testimony is supported by the expert's sworn declaration documcnting her
special knowledge, education, training and experience in hydrology and geology. (R0.A.
85-87.) It is undisputed that appellants' expert is qualified to render an opinion. Since the
County Board's actions required appellants to produce such expert documentation, the
County should pay these fees in the interests of justice Not to pay such legitimate costs
would have a chilling effect on members of the public exercising their legal rights against
arbitrary government action, and would allow the County to profit by its own wrong.

Attorney for Petitioners

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of February, 2008, I delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ATTORNEY FEE MEMORANDUM, addressed to:
Boundary County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1148
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805
Via U.S. Mail
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Phil Robinson
Bonner County Prosecuting Attorney
Courthouse Mail
Via Hand Delivery

In the Supreme Court of the State of X
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA GARDINER, )
husband and wife,
1
)
1
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
)
v.
1
)
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF
1
COMMTSSIONERS,
)

ORDER
NO. 35007
.

Defendant-Appellant.
The Notice of Appeal in the above captioned matter filed in this Court February
19,2007, requested that a Reporter's Transcript be prepared. However, the Notice of Appeal
failed to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 17 in that it did not specify by date and title the

-

hearings required to be prepared for purposes of this Appeal: therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant shall file an AMENDED NOTICE OF

APPEAL which complies with Idaho Appellate Rule 17, and shall specify by date and title the
hearing(s) required to be prepared for purposes of this Appeal.

IT FURTHER IS ORDER that Appellant shall serve the Reporter(s) with a copy
of the Amended Notice of Appeal and shall indicate in the Amended Notice of Appeal which
reporter(s) was served.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED the Amended Notice of Appeal shall be filed with
the District Court within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order. In the event an
Amended Notice of Appeal is not filed, this appeal may proceed on the Clerk's Record ONLY.
DATED this 20" day of February 2008.

cc: Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter

-.-
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From: BONNER COUNTY PROSECUT"?

12062636726

FILED

Boundary County Civil Attorney
Philip H. Robinson (ISB#z323)
PO BOX 1405
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6714
(208) 263-6726 (Fax)
,

,

,

.

IlV CN DISTRICT COUICT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THX COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA
GARDINER, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

vs

1
1

Case No. C V - ~ o o 6 - o o o o o ~ ~ g

.I

1
1
1

AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEXL

1
1
1

BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS,

1
Defendant- Appellant.

1
1

TO: The above-named Plaintiffs Ada and Patrick Gardiner and their attorney,
Paul Vogel PO Box 1828, Sandpoint, ID 83864, the Honorable James Michaud, District
Judge, Courthouse Mail, Sandpoint, ID 83864, and the Clerk of the above-entitled

Court.
NOTICE IS -REBY
1.

GIVEN THAT:

The above-named Appellant, Boundary County (hereinafter "County"), through
the Boundary County Board of Commissioners, appeals from a decision made by
the Honorable James Michaud, District Judge for the First Judicial District of the

-

NOTICE. OF APPEAL I
CV-20064339

a l l0

State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boundary, who entered his Decision on
Appeal on the 3rd day of January, 2008, improperly overruling a land-use
decision of the Board of County Commissioners concerning the approval of a
special use permit for a gravel pit.

2.

This appeal is taken from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boundary.

3.

This appeal is taken to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho from the
Honorable James Michaud's Decision on Appeal which determined that the
County improperly granted a special use permit for a gravel pit. The Court's
Opinion was entered on the 3rd day of January, 2008 at the Boundary County
Courthouse, Boundary County, Idaho, by the Honorable James Michaud, District
Judge presiding.

4.

The County has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the judgment
or order described in paragraph I is an appealable order under and pursuant to
Rule lr(a)(a) I.A.R. in that the order referenced in paragraph I. is a final order of
the District Court on judicial review reversing the decision of the County.

5.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal are:
A.

Did the district court err in holding that, Boundary County's Subdivision

Ordinance pertaining to special use permits is void?
B.

Did the district court err in its determination that the County improperly

shifted the burden of persuasion to the Plaintiffs?
C.

Is Boundary County Ordinance in conflict with Idaho Code 67-6512 and

void on its face?; And
D.

Did the District Court err in awarding attorneys fees and costs to the

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
CV-2006-0339

Plaintiffs?
6.

A reporter's transcript of oral arguments of the District Court that took place on
October 25,2007 regarding the appeal of the decision of the Boundary County
Board of Commissioners and the February 1,2008 regarding Respondent's
Objection to Costs and Fees is requested.

7.

Appellant Boundary County requests that the following documents be included in
the Court's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28,
I.A.R.: the parties' motions, briefs and memorandum below with any briefs,
memoranda and affidavits concerning all issues appealed from herein should be
included and allowed into the clerk's record.

8.

I certify:

(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Reporter.

(ti)

That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee

because the Appellant is a governmental entity, that being Boundary County,
Idaho.
(c)

That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the

preparation of the record because the appellant is a governmental entity, that
being Boundary County, Idaho.
(d)

That the Appellant is exempt from paying the Appellant filing fee because

the appellant is a governmental entity, that being Boundary County, Idaho.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA
GARDINER, husband and wife,

CASE NO. CV-2006-339

Petitioners,

Memorandum Opinion and Order
Setting Aside Special Use Permit
(Corrected)
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,
Respondent.

I

Background: The Boundary County Board of Commissioners granted a special use
permit to Tungsten Holdings, Inc. for a gravel pit operation in an agriculturallforest~y
zone affer the Boundary County Planning and Zoning Commission had recommended a
denial of the permit. Petitioners Patrick and Ada Gardiner seek to have this court reverse
the decision of the county board.
Holdings: James R. Michaud, Senior District Judge held that:
I. Petitioners have standing to be heard on their appeal.
2. The county board's action granting the special use permit to Tungsten may not be
granted under Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, Chapter 7,
pertaining to special use permits. That ordinance violates I.C. 67-6512 which allows a
special use permit only if the use is a listed conditional use in the applicable zone. The
use proposed by Tungsten is not a conditional use in the agriculturallforeshy zone in the
Boundary County Zoning Ordinance.
3. The county board failed to hold the applicant Tungsten to the burden of persuasion
required by law. Instead the county board unlawfully imposed upon the petitioners
Gardiners the burden to demonstrate why the special use permit should not be granted.
4. The petitioners suffered no prejudice as regards notice of hearing in 2005. They were
able, due to the remand, to acquire expert hydrological evidence to present at proceedings
held in 2006.
6.The use by the county board of a statement of potential findings and conclusions and
which were prepared prior to the deliberation to guide deliberations is, by itself, not
arbitrary, capricious nor an abuse of discretion nor a deprivation of due process.

7. The written decision of the county board does not comply with LC. 67-6535 because it
is not a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards considered relevant.
The decision does not fairly resolve all relevant contested facts. The decision lacks a
rationale based upon applicable ordinance and statutory provisions.
8. The board's decision prejudiced the substantial rights of the petitioners and would, if
permitted to stand, result in actual harm. They are entitled to relief from this court setting
aside the decision of the county board.
9. Petitioners are entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred in this action.
1. Fact and Procedural History
In March 2005, Tungsten Holdings, Inc., a Montana real estate developer
("Tungsten"), applied for a special use permit to operate a permanent, commercial gravel
pit on seven acres of property in the agricultural/forestry zone at Porthill, Boundary
County, Idaho. The proposed gravel pit site is on property adjacent to appellants'
Registered Angus cattle ranch. The Boundary County Planning & Zoning Commission
held a public hearing on May 19,2005. R.O.A. 2006, p. 29. The zoning commission
made findings and a recommendation to the Boundary Coulty Board of Commissioners
("county board"), to deny the permit. After apublic hearing the county board approved
the special use permit on September 6,2005. Petitioners filed a request for regulatory
takings analysis pursuant to I.C. 67-8003 which the board later denied.
Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review under Boundary County Case No.
CV-2'005-380.On April 30,2006, Petitioners and the board stipulated that participation
by board member Dinning in the hearings had been a conflict of interest that was
prohibited by LC. 67-6506, and that the permit should be voided and the proceedings
remanded to the board for a new public hearing, without member Dinning participating.
In the stipulation, Petitioners waived any objection to member Dinning's participation in
the prior proceedings. On May 26,2006, the Court entered an Order of Remand voiding
the special use permit and remanding the matter to the county board for a new public
hearing.
A new hearing took place on July 24,2006, before board members Smith and
Kirby. A second board proceeding took place August 7,2006 and board members
Smith and Kirby approved the special use permit. Petitioners filed a request for

regulatory takings analysis and the county board denied that a taking had occurred.
Petitioners filed the petition for judicial review in this case on September 8, 2006.
II. Issues Presented

Petitioners raise the following issues in support of the relief sought in their
petition for judicial review:
1. Did the county board's action violate LC. 67-6512 in that a special use permit
may be granted only if the proposed use is conditionally permitted by the terms of the
zoning ordinance?
2. Does the county board's decision conflict with Sections I and IV of the
Comprehensive Plan in that said approval interferes with appellants' health and safety,
adversely impacts appellants' agricultural use of their property, does not evaluate the
impact of the gravel pit/rock quarry operation on current uses of surrounding land, and
constitutes uncompensated deprivation of petitioners' private property rights?
3. Is the county board's decision supported by substantial evidence in the record?

4. Does the county board's decision fail to comply with LC. 67-6535 in that the
findings approved on August 14,2006 do not state the relevant contested facts relied
upon, fail to explain the rationale for the decision based on applicable provisions of the
Comprehensive Plan, relevant ordinance and statatory provisions and pertinent
constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record?
5. Was the county board's decision made upon unlawful procedure and did it
deprive appellants of due process of law because of inadequate notice or opportunity to
respond?
6. Was the decisioe made upon unlawfd procedure and has it deprived appellants
of due pr'ocess by the Board's pre-hearing statements of confidence in their Road
Superintendent's advocacy for the special use permit, pre-hearing discussions between
the road superintendent and the applicant about obtaining rock from the applicant's
property, statements at the hearing supportive of the road superintendent in retaliation for
adjacent property owners' public comment at the zoning commission hearing, and the
Board's failure to allow appellants to comment on matters outside the record the county
board relied on in making its decision?

7. Was the board's decision arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion in that
deliberations undertaken by the Board on August 7,2006 show bias, and do not constitute
true deliberations but, instead, consist of a mere recitation of a document containing
prepared statements and predetermined responses by unknown parties prior to
deliberation?
8. Does the board's decision constitute unlawful "spot zoning?"
9. Has the board's decision prejudiced substantial rights of the appellant?
10. Are petitioners entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred in this
action?
Respondents raise the following issues:
1. Do the petitioners have standing to bring their petition for judicial review to
this court?
2. Is the county entitled to recover attorney fees and costs against petitioners?
Not all of the issues raised by the parties will be addressed by the court. The rulings of
this court on the issues discussed herein render the remaining issues moot.
111. Nature and Scope of Judicial Review

The standards governing judicial review provide that this Court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented.
I.C.967-5279(1). Rather, this court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1252,
1265 (1998). The agency's factual determinations are binding on this court, even where
there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Judicial review shall be
conducted by the court without a jury, with the review of disputed issues of fact to be
confined to the agency record. I.C.
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67-5277. There is a strong presumption of the

validity favoring the actions of zoning authorities. Howard v Canyon County Board of

Commissioners, 128 Idaho 497,480,915 P.2d 709, 710 (1996).

The county board's decision may only be overturned where its findings: (a)
violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority;
(c) are made upon unlawful procedure: (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. Cj 67-5279.
Whether the Board of Commissionersviolated a statutory provision is a matter of law
over which the court exercises free review. Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County,
137 Idaho 192,196 (2002), Evans v. Tedon County, 139 Idaho 71,75 (2003). Theparty
attacking the Board's decision must first show that the Board erred in a manner specified
in Idaho Code Cj 67-5279(3), and then it must show that its substantial right has been
prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd Of Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583,
586 (1998).

IV. Analysis
A. Appellants Have Standing to Challenge the Board of Commissioner's Decision to
Approve Tungsten's application for a special use permit.
The county board argues the appellants lack standing citing both I.C. Cj 67-6521(d)
and I.C. Cj 67-6535. Standing also has a constitutional dimension. This Court fust notes
that while it recognizes the underlying policy of LC. § 67-6521(d) conferring standing to
affected persons, it is important to remember that the legislature cannot, by statute,
relieve a party from meeting the fundamental constitutional requirements for standing.
See Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798,53 P.3d 1217 (2002).
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) confers standing to seek judicial
review of a local land use decision to an "affected person" aggrieved by the decision. LC.
Cj 67-652 1(d). An affected person is "one having an interest in real property which may

be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development."
LC. § 67-6521(a). Clearly, the appellants' properties may be adversely affected by
development of a gravel pit operation with associated activities of crushing, blasting and
truck traffic all on property adjacent to their rural home and cattle operation. The

appellants have shown they may be affected and therefore they have standing. Standing is
of course distinguished from entitlement to a remedy.
I.C. 5 67-6535(c) requires "actual harm or a violation of fundamental rights" to
obtain a remedy under LLUPA. As stated in Evans v Xeton County, Idaho Board of
Commissioners, 139 Idaho 71,73 P.3d 84:
I.C. 5 67-6535(a) requires that approval or denial of any application provided for
in LLUPA be based on criteria set forth in the local zoning ordinahces and
comprehensive plan. LC. 5 67-6535(c) directs the review of a LLUPA decision.
The language in LC. 5 67-6535(c) instructing courts that "[olnly those whose
challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental
rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of
a decision" cannot be construed as a standing requirement. The existence of real
or potential harm is sufficient to challenge a land use decision. I.C. § 67-6535(c)
requires a demonstration of actual harm or violation of a fundamental right in
order to be entitled to a remedy in cases disputing a LLUPA decision.
Petitioners have met the requirements of I.C. 5 67-6535 as discussed later in this
Memorandum Opinion.
B. The special use permit for a gravel pit, rock quarry or surface mining operation
is not a lawfully issued permit because such uses are not conditional uses listed in
the agriculturaVforestryzone.

Tungsten's application was for a special use permit. The zoning commission held
a special use permit hearing, and the county board considered and premised issuance of
the permit upon Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, Chapter 7,
pertaining to special use permits.
It is the contention of petitioners that under I.C. 67-6512, a special use permit
may only be granted for conditionally permitted uses in the zone district and the uses
proposed by Tungsten are not listed among any category of uses listed in the
agricultural/forestry zone. The county board argues that appellants read the statute too
narrowly and it relies on the ordinance to argue that the permit is lawfbl. The county
board argues that because such permits are "conditionally permitted" that the conflict
with I.C. 67-6512 alleged by petitioners does not exist. Therefore, according to the

county board, the ordinance is not in conflict with the statute and by the Tungsten permit
is proper. The county board's position ignores the plain meaning of the statute which
requires the use, and not the permit, to be conditionally permitted. It also ignores the
definition of a conditional use as set forth in the definition section of the zoning
ordinance.
This Court must construe a local ordinance as it construes a statute. Friends of Farm

to Market v Valley County, 137 Idaho at 196,46 P.3d at 13. Such construction begins
with the literal language of the ordinance. Id. at 197,46 P.3d at 14. If an ordinance is not
ambiguous, this Court need not consider rules of statutory construction and the ordinance
is to be given its plain meaning. Hamilton ex rel. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 135
Idaho 568, 572,21 P.3d 890, 894 (2001); CanaI/Norcrest/CoIumbusAction Comm. v.

City of Boise, 136 Idaho 666,670,39 P.3d 606,610 (2001). Where the language is
ambiguous, this Court applies rules of construction for guidance. Friends of Farm to

Market v Valley County, 137 Idaho at 197,46 P.3d at 14. Constructions that lead to
absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Id. All sections of an applicable
ordinance must be construed together to determine the legislative body's intent. Id. (citing

Lockhart v. Dept. of Fish and Game, 121 Idaho 894,897,828 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992)).
Ordinances are to be construed so as to give effect to all their provisions and not to render
any part superfluous or insignificant. Id. (citing Brown v. Caldwell Sch. Dist. No. 132,
127 Idaho 112, 117,898 P.2d 43,48 (1995)). There is a presumption that a local zoning
board's actions are valid when interpreting and applying its own zoning ordinances. Id.;

Evans, 137 Idaho at 431,50 P.3d at 446.
A conditional use is defined in the definition section of the ordinance as follows:

"Any use within a particular zone district specified by Chapter 7 of this ordinance and
specifically referred to as a conditional use, subject to the procedures set forth at Chapter
12". Section 1E of Chapter 7 of the zoning ordinance states: "Any use not specified in
this section as a use by right or conditional use is eligible for consideration as a special
use, subject to the provisions of Chapter 13." Chapter 13 of the zoning ordinance
delineates the procedures for obtaining a special use pennit. By its terms I.C. 67-6512
provides that a special use permit may be granted to an applicant "if the proposed use is

conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance." Chapter 7, Section 1 of the
Boundary County Zoning Ordinance specifies three categories of uses that are allowed in
an agriculturelforestry zone. They are: uses by right, permitted uses, and conditional uses.
Gravel pits, rock quarries, surface mining operations, rock or gravel extraction activities

are not listed on any list of uses in any of the three categories in the county ordinance.
The county board adopted its planning staff determination that the use proposed
by Tungsten may be considered a commercial use and thus permitted under the
conditional uses of the agriculturallforestry zone. Chapter 13 does provide for a
conditional use permit for commercial business or commercial activity in the
agriculturaVforestry zone. Considering the nature and purpose of comprehensive planning
and zoning, the zones described in the Boundary County zoning ordinance, and the uses

permitted, it is not reasonable to conclude that a gravel pit or surface mining operation
with its aspects of excavation, crushing and blasting can be deemed a commercial
activity. There is an important distinction between commercial and industrial uses.
Gravel pits and surface mines, in the context of community planning and zoning, are an
activity of an extractive and industrial nature involving raw material extraction and
processes such as excavation and crushing with use of heavy equipment and blasting.
The definition of industrial use in the zoning ordinance is: "Commercial: A use or
structure intended primarily for the conduct of retail trade in goods and services." The
definition of industrial use in the zoning ordinance is "Industrial: Use of a parcel or
development of a structure intended primarily for the manufacture, assembly or finishing
of products intended primarily for wholesale distribution." The use sought by Tungsten
might be termed industrial but certainly not commercial. Industrial uses and commercial

uses may not be conditionally permitted in the agriculturaUforestry zone under the zoning
ordinance.
Whether the Board of Commissioners violated a statutory provision is a matter of
law over which the court exercises free review. Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley

County, 137 Idaho 192,196 (2002), Evans v. Teton CounW, 139 Idaho 71,75 (2003). A
county has no authority to act on an ordinance that conflicts with I.C. 67-6512. Fischer

v. City of Ketchurn, 141 Idaho 349,356 (2005). It is fundamental that a county ordinance
may not conflict with general laws. Boise v. Bench Sewer Dist, 116 Idaho 25 (1989)
(county ordinance that conflicts with general law is void); Brower v. Bingham County,
140 Idaho 5 12,515 (2004) (county ordinance that conflicts with local land use planning
statutes is void); In re Ridenbaugh, 5 Idaho 371,375 (1897) (under section 2 of article 12
of the Idaho Constitution, counties may not enact regulations that are in conflict with the
general laws).
I.C. 5 67-6512 is applicable to this case. Because a gravel pit, rock quarry or
surface mining operation is not listed as a conditional use, and cannot be deemed a
commercial use, a special use permit cannot be lawfully issued under the regulations for
the agricufturallforestryzone of the Boundary County zoning ordinance.
In purporting to make a property use that is not conditionally permitted eligible
for pennit as a special use, Section 1E of Chapter 7 of the zoning ordinance conflicts with
I.C. 67-6512. Therefore that section of the ordinance is void. The special use permit
granted to Tungsten by the county board was predicated upon a section of the zoning
ordinance which is in conflict with Idaho law. LC. 67-5279 prohibits the granting of
permits under an ordinance in violation of statutory provision or in excess of the authority
of the county board. Because the permit was issued pursuant to a void ordinance the
county board exceeded its statutory authority which is limited by I.C. 5 67-6512. The
Tungsten permit is prejudicial to the interests of petitioners within the meaning of LC. 5
67-5279(4) as explained below. Even if the ordinance did not conflict with the statute, the
use proposed by Tungsten is not a conditional use or activity permitted under the
ordinance because the use proposed is not a commercial use or activity.
The county board's decision to issue the Tungsten permit is therefore reversed.
The permit was issued pursuant to a void ordinance. Alternatively, if the ordinance is not
void the permit was issued in violafion of that ordinance. Therefore, there is no occasion
for this court to remand this matter to the county board for furfher hearing.

C. Petitioner's were not prejudiced by lack of adequate notice prior to the hearing
or by the refusal of the county board to grant a continuance.

The Zoning Office gave petitioners 15 days' notice of the hearing to be held in
2005 as required by Chapters 13 and 16 of the ordinance. The petitioners claim that in
view of the county board's requirement that petitioners needed expert evidence to prove
that the applicant failed to comply with the plan and ordinance, rather than the other way
around, the abbreviated 15 day notice period was completely inadequate to protect
appellants' rights.
Petitioners contend that through its road superintendent, the county knew about
Tungsten's intentions long before the zoning commission hearing in May 2005. They
argue that the county did not mail notice of the application to petitioners or otherwise
provide public notice until May 2,2005, only two weeks before the hearing. R.O.A.
2005, p. 98. Petitioners' request for continuance of that hearing to submit expert
evidence was denied. Petitioners' subsequent request for continuance of the county board
hearing was denied on the basis that appellants had not obtained their expert evidence for
the zoning hearing. They claim this is a Catch 22 and the county's hearing process
deprived Petitioners of due process.
Decisions by zoning commissions are "quasi-judicial" in nature. Cowan v. Board
of Comnzissioners of Fremont County, Docket No. 30061,2006 Opinion No. 107,2006
Ida. LEXIS 151 (November 29,2006,), p. 16 of Opinion, quoting from Chambers v.
Kootenai County Bd. Of Comm 'rs, 125 Idaho 115,118 (1994). Land use hearings that
are quasi-judicial are subject to due process constraints. Id. Procedural due process
requires some process to ensure the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in
violation of the state or federal constitutions. Id. Due process issues are generally
questions of law over which the court exercises free review. Id. p. 17.
Notice for special use permit hearings is governed by LC. 67-6512. LC. 6765 12(b) provides for published notice 15 days before the hearing, and that specific notice
be given to property owners within 300 feet of the property being considered, and to "any
additional area that may be substantially impacted by the proposed special use" as

determined by the zoning commission. Chapter 13, Section 4(B) and Chapter 16 of the
zoning ordinance requires only 15 days' notice be given to property owners within 300
feet of the land being considered. R.O.A. 2006, p. 259.
Petitioners claim that the notice provisions in the zoning ordinance are inadequate
to provide due process to impacted rural communities. Farm and ranch properties
generally exceed 300 feet from all but their adjacent neighbors. They also argue:
that in rural areas such as Porthill, the 300 foot limitation essentially restricts
notice to all but the two or three neighboring farms.
the impact of a gravel pithock quarry operation affects the entire community, not
just the two adjacent neighbors. Such limited notice conflicts with LC. section
67-6512@).

* with only the nearest property owners notified, special use permits can be granted
more or less in secret. Property owners or the county c a l quietly impose noncompatible uses without the impacted community being aware, as happened with
the prior two special use permit applications in Porthill.
notice by publication is insufficient to directly notice all of the impacted property
owners in a rural area.
these limitations prevent due process and fair hearings.
In planning and zoning decisions, due process requires an opportunity to present and
rebut evidence. Cowan v. Board o f Commr '8, supra. The petitioners got notice as
provided by law. Petitioners sought a continuance in order to obtain expert testimony.
The county board's denial of petitioner's motion for continuance prior to the 2005
hearing was an abuse of discretion especially because the county board placed (albeit
unlawhlly) upon petitioners the burden to show the permit should not be issued to
Tungsten. Such an abuse of discretion would operate to deny a fair hearing. However,
petitioners were not prejudiced by the denial since they were able to obtain expert
hydrological evidence to present at the hearing in 2006.
Petitioners do not have standing to complain about lack of notice to other landowners
who did not get notice in a case where petitioners seek a petition for judicial review. In

an appeal proceeding such as these petitioners cannot seek relief for others because the
procedural rules do not permit a claim for others. Other persons claiming entitlement to
notice would have to b r i g their own petition for review to this court and therein show
their own entitlement to standing.

D. The county board, by failing to hold Tungsten to the burden of persuasion, made
their decision in violation of the county zoning ordinance and engaged in an
unlawful procedure resulting in a decision which must be set aside.

At the hearing held July 26,2005 Chairman Smith asked appellants for "any fact"
or "documentation" that dynamiting could affect somebody's water, or if that was "just a
fear" appellan& had. C.T. 7/26/05, p.15:23-25, p.16:2-12. During that same hearing
Chairman Smith said that Rick Dinning had a "right" to have a gravel pit. C.T. 7/26/05,
p. 43: 11. Board chairman Smith also directed the staff to "come up with" conditions to
"ease the pain" on the community. His directive to staff was that one of the conditions
could not be to not have a gravel pit. C.T. 7/26/05, p. 43:15-21. At the hearing on August
8,2005 Chairman Smith said he "definitely wantled] to approve the pit," and did not
want "delaying tactics" or "road blocks" to "put off the inevitable."
The burden of persuasion is upon the applicant to show that all of the
requirements for a special use permit are satisfied. Fischer v. City of Ketchurn, 141 Idaho
349, 109 p.31d 1091 (Idaho 2005). The statements by board chair Smith indicate that the
burden was upon the Gardiners. There is no indication of any change between the 2005
and 2006 county board proceeding as regards the statements related to the proper
allocation of the burden of persuasion. There is no indication at the hearings held in 2006
or in the written decision of August 14,2006 that the board was holding the applicant
Tungsten to the burden of persuasion.
The county board failed to impose upon Tungsten the burden of persuasion
required by the ordinance provisions concerning special use permits or conditional use
permits. Instead the county board unlawfully placed the burden of showing that the
permit could not be issued upon Gardimers who opposed the application of Tungsten. The

decision of the county board has thus been rendered upon an unlawfid procedure.
Therefore pursuant to LC. 67-5279 the decision granting the permit to Tungsten is set
aside in it entirety.

E. The written decision of the county board does not comply with I.C. 67-6535
because it is not a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards
considered relevant. The decision does not fairly resolve all relevant contested facts.
The decision lacks a rationale based upon applicable ordinance and statutory
provisions.
Assuming that the Boundary County Zoning Ordinance authorizes a special use
permit in an agriculturaUforestry zone, the board's decision must comply with LC. 676535. Under I.C. 67-6535 the issuance of a written decision regarding a local land use
agency's approval or denial of a land use application is required. Evans v. Teton County,
139 Idaho 71,80 (2003). LC. 67-6535 requires the findings to be in writing explaining
the relevant criteria and standards, the relevant contested facts, and the rationale for the
decision based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan and ordinance and
factual information contained in the record. The decision must demonstrate that the
agency applied the criteria prescribed by the law, and did not act arbitrarily or on an adhoc basis. Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls,_l04 Idaho 32 (1982).
Under LC. 67-6535, land use decisions are to be founded upon sound reason and
practical application of recognized principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, courts
are directed to consider the proceedings as a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of
procedures and resultant decisions in the light of practical considerations, hdarnental
fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-making. The decision of the county
board in this case violates petitioners' rights.
Petitioners contend that no meaningful discussion took place in the August 7,
2006 hearing and that Chairman Smith simply parroted a document prepared in advance
to bring the matter to a close. The use of a document, prepared in advance by staff,
identifying alternative findings or choices can be useful as a checklist to guide decision
makers. As such a properly prepared document can be a useful part of the quasi-judicial
process, assuming relevant choices or alternatives are listed and assuming it is understood

not to limit the decision makers but to guide them as to all the issues for decision. The
focus should be upon the board's written decision. The transcript of the board proceeding
has also been reviewed in detail and considered by this court.
This c o w must review the record to determine whether the relevant issues were
identified and factual conflicts determined upon the available evidence. The court's task
is to determine whether the rationale of the written decision is supported by the proper
evaluation of evidence and application of the standards provided by law. In this case both
the written decision issued August 14,2006 and the transcript of the August 7,2006
board proceeding show an absence of meaningful consideration of issues or resolution of
conflicting factual information using the applicable criteria required by law. The colloquy
behveen Smith and Kirby at the board proceeding of August 7,2006 does not address or
resolve the material factual issues concerning the contentions regarding well dewatering
and the impact of noise upon the cattle operation. The same is true as regards the impact
upon the petitioners enjoyment of their residential rural property. There is no indication
of a proper allocation of the burden of persuasion to contradict the statements by Chair
Smith mentioned July 26,2005. The county board discounted the expert opinion of the
hydrologist without basis for doing so. The county board decision briefly comments on
dust abatement but does not fairly address the contentious issues of the adverse impact of
the uses proposed by Tungsten upon the use and the peaceful enjoyment of petitioners'
property. The impacts asserted relative to the cattle operation are dealt with in a
conclusory fashion. A rationale for the conclusions relevant to a fair decision upon the
application is not demonstrated. Thus there is no showing of a proper exercise of
discretion. The written decision ultimately issued August 14,2006 was likewise
conclusory and lacks evidence of considered deliberation. As previously discussed
incorrect criteria and standards were applied. The county board's decision must be set
aside because it violates I.C. 67-6535.

F. Petitioners substantial rights have been prejudiced and they are entitled to relief.

The Board's action granting the special use permit to Tungsten prejudices
petitioners because the gravel pit operation would likely cause actual harm by disrupting
the use and the peaceful enjoyment of petitioners property. Petitioners have also shown
prejudice to their substantial rights to proper application of both procedural and
substantive law. Therefore, they have shown entitlement to relief from this court as
required by I.C. 67-6259 and I.C. 67-6535.

G. Petitioners are entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs.
Appellants claim entitlement to an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to
I.C. 12-117 (1) which states, in part, that:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in

any administrative or civil judicial proceeding
involving as adverse parties a . . . county. . . and a
person, the court shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom
the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law.
Idaho Supreme Court cases are instructive on this issue of attorney fees involving
government action. The standard for awarding attorney fees under I.C. 12-117 requires
focusing on the overall action of the agency. Rincover v. State Dep 't of Fh., 129 Idaho
442 (1996).
In Reardon v. City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court
quoted prior case law and stated:
The purpose of I.C. $ 12-117 is two-fold: First, it
serves "as a deterrent to groundless arbitrary agency
action; and [second] it provides a remedy for persons
who have borne unfair and unjustified financial
burdens defending against groundless charges or

attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should
have made.
Under the statute, attorney fees must be awarded if the court finds in favor of the
appellant and further finds that the county acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
In Reardon attorney fees were awarded to the plaintiff on the basis that the court
determined that the county acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law where an
agency had no authority to take a particular action. In that case, a county ordinance was
enacted contrary to the provisions of Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act. The court
noted that the county's ability to make and enforce local regulations was dependent on
the fact that the regulations were not in conflict with the general laws of the state of
Idaho. Idaho Const. Art. XII, $2.
While the county ordinance in Reardon involved areas of city impact, the
argument is applicable in this case because respondent Boundary County enacted Chapter

7 Section 1(E) in December, 2001 at a point in time after the Legislature repealed similar
language in the earlier version of I.C. 67-6512. The county board is charged with
knowledge that at time of enactment of the ordinance that the language contained therein
had been expressly disapproved by the Legislature. In this case appellants' original
Petition for Judicial Review, filed October 3,2005, raised this issue. The issue was
reasserted in appellants' Petition for Judicial Review filed September 11,2006.
In Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court
awarded attorney fees against the City of Ketchum. The basis was that the city wholly
ignored a provision of its ordinance requiring certification by an Idaho licensed engineer
prior to granting of a conditional use permit. The Boundary County ordinance provisions
of Chapter 13: Special Uses Section 4: Application Procedure: subparagraph C.4)
require the county to fmd that the proposed special use will not create noise, traffic,
odors, dust or other nuisances substantially in excess of permitted uses within the zone
district. Idaho law clearly places the burden of persuasion upon the applicant for a

special use permit. The failure of the county board to place the burden upon the applicant
is prohibited conduct because the county ignored the provisions of its own zoning
ordinance and violated state law.
The issue of attorney fees was present in County Residents Against Pollutionfrom

Septic Sludge (CRAPSS) v. Bonner County, 138 Idaho 585 (2003). The Idaho Supreme
Court in that case upheld the decision of the District Court awarding attorney fees against
the respondent county. The Idaho Supreme Court stated that when the county failed to
follow its ordinance, it acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. In that Bonner
County case, the county arbitrarily dismissed plaintiffs' administrative appeal with no
basis. In this case concerning the Tungsten application, the county board arbitrarily
granted the special use permit with no basis under the ordinance for doing so.
The court concludes that the overall action of the county board warrants this
courts's determination that the county board acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law. Therefore, petitioners are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. Attorney fees
are limited to proceedings subsequent to the stipulation of the parties that each would
bear their own fees incurred prior to April 30,2006.
V. Conclusion

Petitioner's request that the agency action be set aside is granted. Under the
provisions of I.C. 67-5279(3) the decision of the county board was:
a.

In violation of constitutional and statutory provisions;

b.

In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; and

c.

Made upon unlawful procedure.

Defects in hearing procedure in some cases warrant remand for further proceedings to be
held in conformity with the law. However, in this case there shall be no remand. The
county board acted either upon an invalid ordinance or failed to comply with the
ordinance if the ordinance is considered valid. The county board acted in excess of their
lawful authority.

VI. Order
The county board decision to issue the special use permit to Tungsten is set aside.
Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs against the respondent.

Done and dated this 3rdday of January, 2008, with corrections made April 3,
2008.

James R. Michaud
Senior district Judge
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IN TKE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTHCT 0
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
PATRICK GARDWER and ADA
GARDINER, husband and wife,

CASE NO. CV-2006-339

Petitioners.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Setting Aside Special Use Permit
(Corrected)
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,
Respondent.

I

Background: The Boundary County Board of Commissioners granted a special use
permit to Tungsten Holdings, Inc. for a gravel pit operation in an agricultural/forestry
zone after the Boundary County Planning and Zoning Commission had recommended a
denial of the permit. Petitioners Patrick and Ada Gardiner seek to have this court reverse
the decision ofthe county board.
Holdings: James R. Michaud, Senior District Judge held that:
1. Petitioners have standing to be heard on their appeal.
2. The county board's action granting the special use permit to Tungsten may not be
granted under Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, Chapter 7,
pertaining to special use permits. That ordinance violates LC. 67-6512 which allows a
special use permit only if the use is a listed conditional use in the applicable zone. The
use proposed by Tungsten is not a conditional use in the agriculturallforestry zone in the
Boundary County Zoning Ordinance.
3. The county board failed to hold the applicant Tungsten to the burden of persuasion
required by law. Instead the county board unlawfully imposed upon the petitioners
Gardiners the burden to demonstrate why the special use permit should not be granted.
4. The petitioners suffered no prejudice as regards notice of hearing in 2005. They were
able, due to the remand, to acquire expert hydrological evidence to present at proceedings
held in 2006.

6.The use by the county board of a statement of potential findings and conclusions and
which were prepared prior to the deliberation to guide deliberations is, by itself, not
arbitrary, capricious nor an abuse of discretion nor a deprivation of due process.
7. The written decision of the county board does not comply with I.C. 67-6535 because it
is not a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards considered relevant.
The decision does not fairly resolve all relevant contested facts. The decision lacks a
rationale based upon applicable ordinance and statutory provisions.
8. The board's decision prejudiced the substantial rights of the petitioners and would, if
permitted to stand, result in actual harm. They are entitled to relief from this court setting
aside the decision of the county board.
9. Petitioners are entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred in this action.

I. Fact and Procedural History
In March 2005, Tungsten Holdings, Inc., a Montana real estate developer
("Tungsten"), applied for a special use permit to operate a permanent, commercial gravel
pit on seven acres of property in the agricultural/forestry zone at Porthill, Boundary
County, Idaho. The proposed gravel pit site is on property adjacent to appellants'
Registered Angus cattle ranch. The Boundary County Planning & Zoning Commission
held a public hearing on May 19,2005. R.O.A. 2006, p. 29. The zoning commission
made findings and a recommendation to the Boundary County Board of Commissioners
("county board"), to deny the permit. After a public hearing the county board approved
the special use permit on September 6,2005. Petitioners filed a request for regulatory
takings analysis pursuant to LC. 67-8003 which the board later denied.
Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review under Boundary County Case No.
CV-2005-380. On April 30,2006, Petitioners and the board stipulated that participation
by board member Dinning in the hearings had been a conflict of interest that was
prohibited by LC. 67-6506, and that the permit should be voided and the proceedings
remanded to the board for a new public hearing, without member Dinning participating.

In the stipulation, Petitioners waived any objection to member Dinning's participation in
the prior proceedings. On May 26,2006, the Court entered an Order of Remand voiding
the special use permit and remanding the matter to the county board for a new public
hearing.

A new hearing took place on July 24,2006, before board members Smith and
Kirby. A second board proceeding took place August 7,2006 and board members
Smith and Kirby approved the special use permit. Petitioners filed a request for
regulatory takings analysis and the county board denied that a taking had occurred.
Petitioners filed the petition for judicial review in this case on September 8,2006.

n. Issues Presented
Petitioners raise the following issues in support of the relief sought in their
petition for judicial review:
1. Did the county board's action violate I.C. 67-6512 in that a special use permit
may be granted only if the proposed use is conditionally permitted by the terms of the
zoning ordinance?
2. Does the county board's decision conflict with Sections I and IV of the
Comprehensive Plan in that said approval interferes with appellants' health and safety,
adversely impacts appellants' agricultural use of their property, does not evaluate the
impact of the gravel pit/rock quarry operation on current uses of surrounding land, and
constitutes uncompensated deprivation of petitioners' private property rights?

3. Is the county board's decision supported by substantial evidence in the record?

4. Does the county board's decision fail to comply with LC. 67-6535 in that the
fmdings approved on August 14, 2006 do not state the relevant contested facts relied
upon, fail to explain the rationale for the decision based on applicable provisions of the
Comprehensive Plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions and pertinent
constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record?
5. Was the county board's decision made upon unlawfbl procedure and did it
deprive appellants of due process of law because of inadequate notice or opportunity to
respond?

6. Was the decision made upon unlawful procedure and has it deprived appellants
of due process by the Board's pre-hearing statements of confidence in their Road
Superintendent's advocacy for the special use permit, pre-hearing discussions between
the road superintendent and the applicant about obtaining rock from the applicant's
property, statements at the hearing supportive of the road superintendent in retaliation for

adjacent property owners' public comment at the zoning commission hearing, and the
Board's failure to allow appellants to comment on matters outside the record the county
board relied on in making its decision?

7. Was the board's decision arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion in that
deliberations undertaken by the Board on August 7,2006 show bias, and do not constitute
true deliberations but, instead, consist of a mere recitation of a document containing
prepared statements and predetermined responses by unknown parties prior to
deliberation?
8. Does the board's decision constitute unlawful "spot zoning?"
9. Has the board's decision prejudiced substantial rights of the appellant?
10. Are petitioners entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred in this
action?
Respondents raise the following issues:
1. Do the petitioners have standing to bring their petition for judicial review to
this court?
2. Is the county entitled to recover attorney fees and costs against petitioners?
Not a11 of the issues raised by the parties will be addressed by the court. The rulings of
this court on the issues discussed herein render the remaining issues moot.

111. Nature and Scope of Judicial Review
The standards governing judicial review provide that this Court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented.
LC.$67-5279(1). Rather, this court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262,
1265 (1998). The agency's factual determinations are binding on this court, even where
there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Judicial review shall be
conducted by the court without a jury, with the review of disputed issues of fact to be

confined to the agency record. LC. $ 67-5277. There is a strong presumption of the
validity favoring the actions of zoning authorities. Howard v Canyon County Board of

Commissioners, 128 Idaho 497,480,915 P.2d 709,710 (1996).
The county board's decision may only be overturned where its findings: (a)
violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority;
(c) are made upon unlawful procedure: (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. $ 67-5279.
Whether the Board of Commissioners violated a stahtory provision is a matter of law
over which the court exercises fiee review. Friends ofFarm to Market v. Valley County,
137 Idaho 192,196 (2002), Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,75 (2003). The party
attacking the Board's decision must first show that the Board erred in a manner specified
in Idaho Code $ 67-5279(3), and then it must show that its substantial right has been
prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd. Of Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583,
586 (1998).

IV. Analysis
A. Appellants Have Standig to Challenge the Board of Commissioner's Decision to
Approve Tungsten's application for a special use permit.
The county board argues the appellants lack standing citing both I.C. $67-652l(d)
and LC. $ 67-6535. Standmg also has a constitutional dimension. This Court first notes
that while it recognizes the underlying policy of I.C. $ 67-6521(d) conferring standing to
affected persons, it is important to remember that the legislature cannot, by statute,
relieve a party from meeting the fundamental constitutional requirements for standing.
See Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798,53 P.3d 1217 (2002).
The Local Land Use PIanning Act (LLUPA) confers standing to seek judicial
review of a local land use decision to an "affected person" aggrieved by the decision. LC.
$ 67-6521(d). An affected person is "one having an interest in real property which may

be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development."
I.C. $ 67-6521(a). Clearly, the appellants' properties may be adversely affected by

development of a gravel pit operation with associated activities of crushing, blasting and
truck traffic all on property adjacent to their rural home and cattIe operation. The
appellants have shown they may be affected and therefore they have standing. Standing is
of course distinguished from entitlement to a remedy.
LC. 9 67-6535(c) requires "actual harm or a violation of fundamental rights" to
obtain a remedy under LLUPA. As stated in Evans v Teton County, Idaho Board of
Commissioners, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84:
I.C. 9 67-6535(a) requires that approval or denial of any application provided for
in LLUPA be based on criteria set forth in the local zoning ordinances and
comprehensive plan. I.C. 5 67-653S(c) directs the review of a LLWA decision.
The language in I.C. 9 67-6535(c) instructing courts that "[olnly those whose
challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental
rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of
a decision" cannot be construed as a standing requirement. The existence of real
or potential harm is sufticient to challenge a land use decision. LC. 9 67-6535(c)
requires a demonstration of actual harm or violation of a fundamental right in
order to be entitled to a remedy in cases disputing a LLUPA decision.
Petitioners have met the requirements of I.C. 9 67-6535 as discussed later in this
Memorandum Opinion.

B. The special use permit for a gravel pit, rock quarry or surface mining operation
is not a lawfully issued permit because such uses are not conditional uses listed in
the agricu1turaVforestt-y zone.
Tungsten's application was for a special use permit. The zoning commission held
a special use permit hearing, and the county board considered and premised issuance of
the permit upon Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, Chapter 7,
pertaining to special use permits.
It is the contention of petitioners that under LC. 67-6512, a special use permit
may only be granted for conditionally permitted uses in the zone district and the uses
proposed by Tungsten are not listed among any category of uses listed in the
agricultural/forestry zone. The county board argues that appellants read the statute too
narrowly and it relies on the ordinance to argue that the permit is lawful. The county

board argues that because such permits are "conditionally permitted" that the conflict
with I.C. 67-6512 alleged by petitioners does not exist. Therefore, according to the
county board, the ordinance is not in conflict with the statute and by the Tungsten permit
is proper. The county board's position ignores the plain meaning of the statute which
requires the use, and not the permit, to be conditionally permitted. It also ignores the
defintion of a conditional use as set forth in the definition section of the zoning
ordinance.
This Court must construe a local ordinance as it construes a statute. Friends ofFarm

to Market v Valley County, 137 Idaho at 196,46 P.3d at 13. Such construction begins
with the literal language of the ordinance. Id. at 197,46 P.3d at 14. If an ordinance is not
ambiguous, this Court need not consider rules of statutory construction and the ordinance
is to be given its plain meaning. Hamilton ex rel. Hanzilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 135
Idaho 568,572,21 P.3d 890,894 (2001); CanaVNorcrest/ColumbbuAction Comm. v.

City of Boise, 136 Idaho 666,670,39 P.3d 606,610 (2001). Where the language is
ambiguous, this Court applies rules of construction for guidance. Friends of Farm to

Market v Valley County, 137 Idaho at 197,46 P.3d at 14. Constructions that lead to
absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Id. All sections of an applicable
ordinance must be construed together to determine the legislative body's intent. Id. (citing

Lockhart v. Dept. of Fish and Game, 121 Idaho 894,897,828 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992)).
Ordinances are to be construed so as to give effect to all their provisions and not to render
any part superfluous or insignificant. Id. (citing Brown v. Caldwell Sch. Disf. No. 132,
127 Idaho 112,117, 898 P.2d 43,48 (1995)). There is a presumption that a local zoning
board's actions are valid when interpreting and applying its own zoning ordinances. Id.;

Evans, 137 Idaho at 431,50 P.3d at 446.
A conditional use is defined in the definition section of the ordinance as follows:
"Any use within a particular zone district specified by Chapter 7 of this ordinance and
specifically referred to as a conditiollal use, subject to the procedures set forth at Chapter
12". Section IE of Chapter 7 of the zoning ordinance states: "Any use not specified in
this section as a use by right or conditional use is eligibfe for consideration as a special
use, subject to the provisions of Chapter 13." Chapter 13 of the zoning ordinance

delineates the procedures for obtaining a special use permit. By its terms I.C. 67-6512
provides that a special use permit may be granted to an applicant "if the proposed use is
conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance." Chapter 7, Section 1 of the
Boundary County Zoning Ordinance specifies three categories of uses that are allowed in
an agricultue/forestry zone. They are: uses by right, permitted uses, and conditional uses.
Gravel pits, rock quarries, surface mining operations, rock or gravel extraction activities
are not listed on any list of uses in any of the three categories in the county ordinance.
The county board adopted its planning staff determination that the use proposed
by Tungsten may be considered a commercial use and thus permitted under the
conditional uses of the agricultural/forestry zone. Chapter 13 does provide for a
conditional use permit for commercial business or commercial activity in the
agricultural/forestryzone. Considering the nature and purpose of comprehensive planning
and zoning, the zones described in the Boundary County zoning ordinance, and the uses
permitted, it is not reasonable to conclude that a gravel pit or surface mining operation
with its aspects of excavation, crushing and blasting can be deemed a commercial
activity. There is an important distinction between commercial and industrial uses.

Gravel pits and surface mines, in the context of community planning and zoning, are an
activity of an extractive and industrial nature involving raw material extraction and
processes such as excavation and crushing with use of heavy equipment and blasting.
The definition of industrial use in the zoning ordinance is: "Co~nmercial:A use or
structure intended primarily for the conduct of retail trade in goods and services." The
definition of industrial use in the zoning ordinance is "Industrial: Use of a parcel or
development of a structure intended primarily for the manufacture, assembly or fdshing
of products intended primarily for wholesale distribution." The use sought by Tungsten
might be termed industrial but certainly not commercial. Industrial uses and commercial
uses may not be conditionally permitted in the agricultural/forestry zone under the zoning
ordinance.
Whether the Board of Commissioners violated a statutory provision is a matter of
law over which the court exercises free review. Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley

County, 137 Idaho 192,196 (2002), Evans v. Teton Counlv, 139 Idaho 71,75 (2003). A
county has no authority to act on an ordinance that conflicts with I.C. 67-6512. Fischer

v. City of Ketchurn, 141 Idaho 349,356 (2005). It is fundamental that a county ordinance
may not conflict with general laws. Boise v. Bench Sewer Dist:, 116 Idaho 25 (1989)
(county ordinance that conflicts with general law is void); Brower v. Bingham County,
140 Idaho 5 12,515 (2004) (county ordinance that conflicts with local land use planning
statutes is void); In re Ridenbaugh, 5 Idaho 371,375 (1897) (under section 2 of article 12
of the Idaho Constitution, counties may not enact regulations that are in conflict with the
general laws).
LC. $ 67-6512 is applicable to this case. Because a gravel pit, rock quarry or
surface mining operation is not listed as a conditional use, and cannot be deemed a
commercial use, a special use permit cannot be lawfdly issued under the regulations for
the agriculturaliforestry zone of the Boundary County zoning ordinance.

In purporting to make a property use that is not conditionally permitted eligible
for permit as a special use, Section 1E of Chapter 7 of the zoning ordinance conflicts with
LC. 67-6512. Therefore that section of the ordinance is void. The special use permit
granted to Tungsten by the county board was predicated upon a section of the zoning
ordinance which is in conflict with Idaho law. LC. 67-5279 prohibits the granting of
permits under an ordinance in violation of statutory provision or in excess of the authority
of the county board. Because the pennit was issued pursuant to a void ordinance the
county board exceeded its statutory authority which is limited by LC. $67-6512. The
Tungsten permit is prejudicial to the interests of petitioners within the meaning of LC. $
67-5279(4) as explained below. Even if the ordinance did not conflict with the statute, the
use proposed by Tungsten is not a conditional use or activity permitted under the
ordinance because the use proposed is not a commercial use or activity.
The county board's decision to issue the Tungsten permit is therefore reversed.
The permit was issued pursuant to a void ordinance. Alternatively, if the ordinance is not
void the permit was issued in violation of that ordinance. Therefore, there is no occasion
for this court to remand this matter to the county board for further hearing.

C. Petitioner's were not prejudiced b y lack of adequate notice prior to the hearing

or b y the refusal of the county board to grant a continuance.

The Zoning Office gave petitioners 15 days' notice of the hearing to be held in
2005 as required by Chapters 13 and 16 of the ordinance. The petitioners claim that in
view of the county board's requirement that petitioners needed expert evidence to prove
that the applicant failed to comply with the plan and ordinance, rather than the other way
around, the abbreviated 15 day notice period was completely inadequate to protect
appellants' rights.
Petitioners contend that through its road superintendent, the county knew about
Tungsten's intentions long before the zoning commission hearing in May 2005. They
argue that the county did not mail notice of the application to petitioners or otherwise
provide public notice until May 2,2005, only two weeks before the hearing. R.O.A.
2005, p. 98. Petitioners' request for continuance of that hearing to submit expert
evidence was denied. Petitioners' subsequent request for continuance of the county board
hearing was denied on the basis that appellants had not obtained their expert evidence for
the zoning hearing. They claim this is a Catch 22 and the county's hearing process
deprived Petitioners of due process.
Decisions by zoning commissions are "quasi-judicial" in nature. Cowan v. Board
of Commissioners of Fremont County, Docket No. 30061,2006 Opinion No. 107,2006
Ida. LEXIS 151 (November 29,2006,), p. 16 of Opinion, quoting fiom Chambers v.
Kootenai County Bd. Of Comm'rs, 125 Idaho 115,118 (1994). Land use hearings that
are quasi-judicial are subject to due process constraints. Id. Procedural due process
requires some process to ensure the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in
violation of the state or federal constitutions. Id. Due process issues are generally
questions of law over which the court exercises free review. Id p. 17.
Notice for special use permit hearings is governed by LC. 67-6512. LC. 6765 12(b) provides for published notice 15 days before the hearing, and that specific notice
be given to property owners within 300 feet of the property being considered, and to "any

additional area that may be substantially impacted by the proposed special use" as
determined by the zoning commission. Chapter 13, Section 4(B) and Chapter 16 of the
zoning ordinance requires only 15 days' notice be given to property owners within 300
feet of the land being considered. R.O.A. 2006, p. 259.
Petitioners claim that the notice provisions in the zoning ordinance are inadequate
to provide due process to impacted rural communities. Farm and ranch properties
generally exceed 300 feet from all but their adjacent neighbors. They also argue:
that in rural areas such as Porthill, the 300 foot limitation essentially restricts
notice to all but the two or three neighboring farms.
e

the impact of a gravel pit/rock quarry operation affects the entire community, not
just the two adjacent neighbors. Such limited notice conflicts with I.C. section
67-65 12(b).

with only the nearest property owners notified, special use pennits can be granted
more or less in secret. Property owners or the county can quietly impose noncompatible uses without the impacted community being aware, as happened with
the prior two special use permit applications in Porthill.
e

notice by publication is insufficient to directly notice all of the impacted property
owners in a rural area.

e

these limitations prevent due process and fair hearings.

In planning and zoning decisions, due process requires an opportunity to present and
rebut evidence. Cowan v. Board of Commr 's, supra. The petitioners got notice as
provided by law. Petitioners sought a continuance in order to obtain expert testimony.
The county board's denial of petitioner's motion for continuance prior to the 2005
hearing was an abuse of discretion especially because the county board placed (albeit
unIawfidIy) upon petitioners the burden to show the permit should not be issued to
Tungsten. Such an abuse of discretion would operate to deny a fair hearing. However,
petitioners were not prejudiced by the denial since they were able to obtain expert
hydrological evidence to present at the hearing in 2006.

Petitioners do not have standing to complain about lack of notice to other landowners
who did not get notice in a case where petitioners seek a petition for judicial review. In
an appeal proceeding such as these petitioners cannot seek relief for others because the
procedural rules do not permit a claim for others. Other persons claiming entitlement to
notice would have to bring their own petition for review to this court and therein show
their own entitlement to standing.

D. The county board, by failing to hold Tungsten to the burden of persuasion, made
their decision in violation of the county zoning ordinance and engaged in an
unlawful procedure resulting in a decision which must be set aside.
At the hearing held July 26,2005 Chairman Smith asked appellants for "any fact"
or "documentation" that dynamiting could affect somebody's water, or if that was "just a
fear" appellants had. C.T. 7/26/05, p.15:23-25, p.16:2-12. During that same hearing
Chairman Smith said that Rick Dinning had a "right" to have a gravel pit. C.T. 7/26/05,
p. 43: 11. Board chairman Smith also directed the staff to "come up with" conditions to
"ease the paLn" on the community. His directive to staff was that one of the conditions
could not be to not have a gravel pit. C.T. 7/26/05, p. 43:15-21. At the hearing on August
8,2005 Chairman Smith said he "definitely want[ed] to approve the pit," and did not
want "delaying tactics" or "road blocks" to '<put off the inevitable."
The burden of persuasion is upon the applicant to show that all of the
requirements for a special use permit aresatisfied. Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho
349, 109 ~

. 1091
3 (Idaho
~ ~2005). The statements by board chair Smith indicate that the

burden was upon the Gardiners. There is no indication of any change between the 2005
and 2006 county board proceeding as regards the statements related to the proper
allocation of the burden of persuasion. There is no indication at the hearings held in 2006
or in the written decision of August 14,2006 that the board was holding the applicant
Tungsten to the burden of persuasion.
The county board failed to impose upon Tungsten the burden of persuasion
required by the ordinance provisions concerning special use permits or conditional use

permits. Instead the county board unlawfully placed the burden of showing that the
permit could not be issued upon Gardiners who opposed the application of Tungsten. The
decision of the county board has thus been rendered upon an unlawfid procedure.
Therefore pursuant to LC. 67-5279 the decision granting the permit to Tungsten is set
aside in it entirety.

E. The written decision of the county board does not comply with I.C. 67-6535
because it is not a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards
considered relevant. The decision does not fairly resolve all relevant contested facts.
The decision lacks a rationale based upon applicable ordinance and statutory
provisions.
Assuming that the Boundary County Zoning Ordinance authorizes a special use
permit in an agriculWforestry zone, the board's decision must comply with LC. 67-

6535. Under I.C. 67-6535 the issuance of a written decision regarding a local land use
agency's approval or denial of a land use application is required. Evans v. Teton County,

139 Idaho 71, 80 (2003). LC. 67-6535 requires the findings to be in writing explaining
the relevant criteria and standards, the relevant contested facts, and the rationale for the
decision based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan and ordinance and
factual information contained in the record. The decision must demonstrate that the
agency applied the criteria prescribed by the law, and did not act arbitrarily or on an adhoc basis. Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls,.l04 Idaho 32 (1982).
Under I.C. 67-6535, land use decisions are to be founded upon sound reason and
practical application of recognized principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, courts
are directed to consider the proceedmgs as a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of
procedures and resultant decisions in the light of practical considerations, fundamental
fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-making. The decision of the county
board in this case violates petitioners' rights.
Petitioners contend that no meaningful discussion took place in the August 7 ,

2006 hearing and that Chairman Smith simply panoted a document prepared in advance
to bring the matter to a close. The use of a document, prepared in advance by staff,
identifying alternative findings or choices can be useful as a checklist to guide decision

makers. As such a properly prepared document can be a useful part of the quasi-judicial
process, assuming relevant choices or alternatives are listed and assuming it is understood
not to limit the decision makers but to guide them as to all the issues for decision. The
focus should be upon the board's written decision. The transcript of the board proceeding
has also been reviewed in detail and considered by this court.
This court must review the record to determine whether the relevant issues were
identified and factual conflicts determined upon the available evidence. The court's task
is to determine whether the rationale of the written decision is supported by the proper
evaluation of evidence and application of the $tandards provided by law. In this case both
the written decision issued August 14,2006 and the transcript of the August 7,2006
board proceeding show an absence of meaningful consideration of issues or resolution of
conflicting factual information using the applicable criteria required by law. The colloquy
between Smith and Kirby at the board proceeding of August 7,2006 does not address or
resolve the material factual issues concerning the contentions regarding well dewatering
and the impact of noise upon the cattle operation. The same is true as regards the impact
upon the petitioners enjoyment of their residential rural property. There is no indication
of a proper allocation of the burden of persuasion to contradict the statements by Chair
Smith mentioned July 26,2005. The county board discounted the expert opinion of the
hydrologist without basis for doing so. The county board decision briefly comments on
dust abatement but does not fairly address the contentious issues of the adverse impact of
the uses proposed by Tungsten upon the use and the peaceful enjoyment of petitioners'
property. The impacts asserted relative to the cattle operation are dealt with in a
conclusory fashion. A rationale for the conclusions relevant to a fair decision upon the
application is not demonstrated. Thus there is no showing of a proper exercise of
discretion. The written decision ultimately issued August 14,2006 was likewise
conclusory and lacks evidence of considered deliberation. As previously discussed
incorrect criteria and standards were applied. The county board's decision must be set
aside because it violates I.C. 67-6535.

F. Petitioners substantial rights have been prejudiced and they are entitled to relief.

The Board's action granting the special use permit to Tungsten prejudices
petitioners because the gravel pit operation would likely cause actual harm by disrupting
the use and the peaceful enjoyment of petitioners property. Petitioners have also shown
prejudice to their substantial rights to proper application of both procedural and
substantive law. Therefore, they have shown entitlement to relief from this court as
required by LC. 67-6259 and I.C. 67-6535.

G. Petitioners are entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs.
Appellants claim entitlement to an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to
LC. 12-117 (1) which states, in part, that:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in
any administrative or civil judicial proceeding
involving as adverse parties a . . . county . . . and a
person, the court shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable
expenses, if the court fmds that the party against whom
the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law.
Idaho Supreme Court cases are instructive on this issue of attorney fees involving
government action. The standard for awarding attorney fees under LC. 12-117 requires
focusing on the overall action of the agency. Rincover v. State Dep 't of Fin,, 129 Idaho
442 (1 996).
In Reardon v. City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court
quoted prior case law and stated:
The purpose of LC. 5 12-117 is two-fold: First, it
serves "as a deterrent to groundless arbitrary agency
action; and [second] it provides a remedy for persons

who have borne unfair and unjustified financial
burdens defending against groundless charges or
attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should
have made.
Under the statute, attorney fees must be awarded if the court finds in favor of the
appellant and further finds that the county acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
In Reardon attomey fees were awarded to the plaintiff on the basis that the court
determined that the county acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law where an
agency had no authority to take a particular action. In that case, a county ordinance was
enacted contrary to the provisions of Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act. The court
noted that the county's ability to make and enforce local regulations was dependent on
the fact that the regulations were not in conflict with the general laws of the state of
Idaho. Idaho Const. Art.XII, 4 2.
While the county ordinance in Reardon involved areas of city impact, the
argument is applicable in this case because respondent Boundary County enacted Chapter

7 Section 1(E) in December, 2001 at a point in time after the Legislature repealed similar
language in the earlier version of LC. 67-6512. The county board is charged with
knowledge that at time of enactment of the ordinance that the language contained therein
had been expressly disapproved by the Legislature. In this case appellants' original
Petition for Judicial Review, filed October 3,2005, raised this issue. The issue was
reasserted in appellants' Petition for Judicial Review filed September 11,2006.
In Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court
awarded attomey fees against the City of Ketchum. The basis was that the city wholly
ignored a provision of its ordinance requiring certification by an Idaho licensed engineer
prior to granting of a conditional use permit. The Boundary County ordinance provisions
of Chapter 13: Special Uses Section 4: Application Procedure: subparagraph C.4)
require the county to find that the proposed special use will not create noise, traffic,

odors, dust or other nuisances substantially in excess of permitted uses within the zone
district. Idaho law clearly places the burden of persuasion upon the applicant for a
special use permit. The failure of the county board to place the burden upon the applicant
is prohibited conduct because the county ignored the provisions of its own zoning
ordinance and violated state law.
The issue of attorney fees was present in County Residents Against Pollutionfi.orn
Septic Sludge (CRAPSS) v. Bonner County, 138 Idaho 585 (2003). The Idaho Supreme
Court in that case upheld the decision of the District Court awarding attorney fees against
the respondent county. The Idaho Supreme Court stated that when the county failed to
follow its ordinance, it acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. In that Bonner
County case, the county arbitrarily dismissed plaintiffs' administrative appeal with no
basis. In this case concerning the Tungsten application, the county board arbitrarily
granted the special use permit with no basis under the ordinance for doing so.
The court concludes that the overall action of the county board warrants this
courts's determination that the county board acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law. Therefore, petitioners are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. Attorney fees
are limited to proceedings subsequent to the stipulation of the parties that each would
bear their own fees incurred prior to April 30,2006.
V. Conclusion

Petitioner's request that the agency action be set aside is granted. Under the
provisions of LC. 67-5279(3) the decision of the county board was:
a.

In violation of constitutional and statutory provisions;

b.

In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; and

c.

Made upon unlawful procedure.

Defects in hearing procedure in some cases warrant remand for further proceedings to be
held in confarmity with the law. However, in this case there shall be no remand. The
county board acted either upon an invalid ordinance or failed to comply with the

ordinance if the ordinance is considered valid. The county board acted in excess of their
lawful authority.

VI. Order
The county board decision to issue the special use permit to Tungsten is set aside.
Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs against the respondent.
Done and dated this 31d day of January, 2008, with corrections made April 3,

Senior district Judge
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CASE NO. CV-2006-339
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Memorandum Opinion and Order
Awarding Attorney Fees and Costs

VS.
BOUNDARYCOUNTYBOARDOF
CO~4~.4ISSIONEIIS,
Respondent.

The court previously awarded attorney fees and costs in favor of petitioners and
against respondent. Such award was made because the overall action of the county board
warranted this court's determination that the county board acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law. Attorney fees were limited by the stipuIation of the parties that each
would bear their own fees incurred prior to April 30,2006. The court has considered the
briefing submitted on behalf of the parties and the arguments presented in open court.

OBJECTIONS BY RESPONDENT
The respondent county objects to attorney fees and costs making the following
contentions:

1. The amount of time for Mr. Vogel's professional services was not reasonable
because an alternate remedy of a petition for declaratory judgment should have been

utilized instead of assisting his clients at the county administrative level and then seeking
judicial review of the commissioners' decision to grant the Tungsten permit.
2. The expert fees of Kristine Uhlman are excessive and the Lexpert Research
services referral fee is unreasonable under the circumstances of this case where
petitioners are attorneys and could have located an expert at a lesser referral cost.

3. The petitioners should not be given more liberal consideration by the court as
regards discretionary fees because petitioners reduced the overall attorney fees by
performing 200 hours of their own research for which no billing is made.

4. Automated legal research cost of $8,114 are not recoverable under I.R.C.P. 54
(e) (3) (K) and are unreasonable and excessive.

DISCUSSION
Respondents contend that petitioners should have sought the alternative of a
petition for declaratoryjudgment which would have been less costly. Such contention is

an invitation that the court speculate as to the time and effort required, as well as the
efficacy, of alternative litigation never undertaken. The court declines to do so because
to determine whether the county would have resisted such declaration, what defenses
might have been employed, and the professional attorney services needed to litigate
would be pure guesswork. There is no basis upon which this court could determine the
outcome of litigation which was never undertaken. What about petitioners' duty to
exhaust administrative remedies? Was the respondent willing to stay the administrative
proceedings and proceed with declaratory judgment? Did the respondent ever consider
petitioning for declaratoryjudgment? After all, the petitioner made very clear, and in a
very timely manner, to respondent that the Boundary County Zoning Ordinance
precluded issuance of the Tungsten permit.
Speculation is not appropriate and the court declines to consider what might have
been in hindsight where there is no showing that the county, at any relevant point in time,
sought or suggested a more efficient means to resolve the case. It bears remembering that
this courts award of costs and attorney fees was predicated upon the overall action of the
county board which was that the county board acted without a reasonable basis in fact or

law. The attorney fee time, rate and services performed were reasonably and necessarily
incurred considering the factors provided in I.R.C.P. 54 (e) (3) and the sum of $5,222.00
shall be awarded against respondent.
The expert fees of Kristine Uhlman are awarded in the sum of $5000. This court
recognizes the interplay of costs of right and discretionary costs as regards expert fees
under I.R.C.P. 54 (d) (1). The expert fees claimed were necessarily incuned and were
exceptional for reasons set forth in this court's prior Memorandum and Order. Such costs
were actually incurred and paid, necessary, reasonable, and exceptional under the
circumstances of the county commissioner's procedure. Justice demands that such an
exceptional cost be assessed against respondent. The Lexperl Research Services Referral
fee of $1250.00 has not been demonstrated to have been necessary or exceptional and
shall not be awarded. Airfare is not an exceptional cost and is not awarded. See, Fish v.
Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.ZdI 75 (1998)
The court agrees with respondent that the petitioners should not be given more
liberal consideration by the court as regards discretionary fees because petitioners
reduced the overall attorney fees by performing 200 hours of their own research for
which no billing is made. That however does not end the inquiry.
Under I.R.C.P. 54 (e) (3) (K) this court must consider the reasonable cost of
automated legal research when awarding reasonable attorney fees. Mr. Vogel's affidavit
proves that his attorney fees were lessened by the use of automated legal research. That
fact warrants consideration of an award of the reasonable and necessary cost of
automated legal research as a discretionary cost not included in his attorney fees if they
are exceptional. Such costs of automated legal research fees could be awarded under
I.R.C.P. 54 (e) (3) (K) if performed by Mr. Vogel. That they were not performed by him
personally should not preclude an award as an exceptional cost if the costs were
necessary, reasonable, actually incurred and exceptional. Such costs are determined to be
exceptional because they reduced significantly Mr. Vogel's attorney fees. Petitioners
were able to provide competent legal research as shown by the briefing which

demonstrates the same. The affidavits of Mr. Vogel and Ada Gardiner show the
cooperation between the research by Gardiners and the review and finalization of briefing
by Mr. Vogel. The research was certainly necessary in this case. The court is mindful
that the research was accomplished by the petitioners who are lawyers and parties. Pro se
attorneys may not collect attorney fees but that is not the circumstance here present.
Under I.R.C.P. 54 (e)(l) paralegal fees may be awarded. Paralegals often perform
automated legal research. The aEdavits of Mr. Vogel and Ada Gardiner show that the
Gardiners briefing could be considered in the nature of paralegal work. That Gardiners
can be deemed paralegals is another exceptional circumstancejustifying consideration of
an award of a reasonable and necessary cost as a discretionary cost. However, paralegal
time cannot be awarded in this case even though Mr. Vogel's affidavit shows 200 hours
of research by Gardiners. No time records are provided to demonstrate the
reasonableness of the cost requested. Thus the petitioners shall not be awarded fees
against the county for paralegal services. The question remains may the cost of
subscribing for automated legal research be awarded as a discretionary cost.

A reasonable cost should in fairness be awarded to petitioners for the cost of
automated legal research. Although performed by Gardiners and not by Mr. Vogel such
cost is determined by this court to be reasonable and necessary. The cost should be
awarded considering the combined purposes and effect of I.R.C.P. 54 (e)(l) and I.R.C.P.

54 (e) (3) (K). Incurring that cost reduced the attorney fees of Mr. Vogel. The
circumstance of the performance of legal research by Gardiners in this case is ruled
exceptional as stated above. However, the subscription costs set forth in the affidavit of
Ada Gardiner are not shown to be reasonable because the affidavit and associated billings
are not sufficiently detailed as regards the detail of issues researched. The monthly
subscription cost by itself is not a reasonable basis for an award because it is a monthly
cost without regard to the requirements of this case. A reasonable award should be made
based upon the need to focus primarily upon existing Idaho statutes, case law and the
relevant ordinances of Boundary County. Idaho statutory and case law existed on all
aspects of this case. This court is experienced with automated legal research and utilizes
the same in performing duties as a senior district judge. I have experience with both
Casemaker provided as a result of Idaho State Bar Membership and with Westlaw. It is

this judge's practice to utilize automated legal research so as not to burden the law clerks
of the judges over whose cases I preside. I know from personal experience the value,
efficiency, speed and cost of automated legal research. An award of $2000 for the cost to
access automated legal research is appropriate as a discretionary cost in this case. The
briefing submitted on behalf of petitioners shows excellent legal research which was of
invaluable assistance to the court. The court emphasizes that no award is made for any
work performed by Gardiners as either attorneys or paralegals as no such professional
fees are claimed nor sufficiently detailed. Only the cost of accessing automated legal
research is awarded.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner's request for attorney fees and costs should be awarded as follows:
Attorney fees:

$5200.00

Costs as a matter of Right

$

Costs under Appellate Rule 40(b)

$302.25

82.00

Discretionary Costs
Expert fees

$5000.00

Automated Legal Research

$2000.00

TOTAL

$12,584.25

ORDER
Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs against the
respondent as set forth above.
IT IS SO ORDERED at Bonners Ferry this 15th day of April, 2008.

~er%ordistrict Judge
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I, Della A. Armstrong, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District,
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boundary, do hereby certify that the
foregoing Record in this cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true,
correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by Appellate
Rule 28.
I further certify that, in addition to the exhibits identified in the Reporter's
Transcript, the following will be submitted as exhibits to this Record on Appeal:
I.Agency's Transcript and Certified Copy of Commissioner Minutes and CD of
7/24/06 and 8/7/06 Hearings before Commissioners Filed March 14'~,2007
2. Agency's Transcript and Certified Copy of Minutes of 8/7/06 Filed March 14'~,
2007
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA GARDMER, )
husband and wife,
1

1
1
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Petitioners-Respondents,
v.

)

1
1

BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,

ORDER GRANTING REQUEST
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Supreme Court Docket No. 35007-2008
Boundary County Case No. 2006-339

1
)

Ref. No. 08-20]

1
1
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Respondent-Appellant,
and

)

TUNGSTEN HOLDINGS, INC.,

1

Intervenor-Appellant.

1

A REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD with
attachments, AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE,
MEMORANDUM

OF

POINTS

AND

AUTHORITIES

and

CERTIFICATE

OF

UNCONTESTED MOTION were filed by counsel for Respondents on October 10, 2008. The
Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE be,
and hereby is, GRANTED and this Court shall take JUDICIAL NOTICE of the following
chapters of the Boundary County, Idaho Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, as amended
through March, 2006, copies of which accompanied this Request as Exhibits 1 and 2, and shall
be placed in this Record on Appeal as EXHIBITS:

1. Chapter 8, "Non-Conforming Uses."
2. Chapter 9, "Variances."
DATED this

eday of November 2008.
&
,

By Order of the Supreme Court
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5. Amendment to Transcript (August 7th,2006) Filed March 14'~,2007

6. Amendment to Transcript (July 24th,2006) Filed March 14'~,2007
7. Administrator's Record Filed March 14'~,2007
8. Administrator's Record Filed March 14'~,2007
9. Copy of Boundary County file CV-2005-380

10. Record Filed in CV-2005-380 October 3lSt,2005
11. Administrator's Transcript of May lgth, 2005 hearing Filed in CV-2005-380
October 3lSt,2005
~ , Hearing Filed in CV-2005-380 October
12. Clerk's Transcript of July ~ 6 ' 2006

13. Clerk's Transcript of August ath, 2005 Hearing Filed in CV-2005-380 October

14. Clerk's Transcript of September 6th, 2005 Hearing Filed in CV-2005-380 Filed
October 17", 2005.
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said Court this \wdayof
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